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In the recent financial crisis, macroeconomic stimuli produced mixed results across developed economies.
In contrast, China's stimulus boosted real GDP growth from an annualized 6.2% in the first quarter
of 2009 trough to 11.9% in the first quarter of 2010.  Amidst this phenomenal response, land auction
and house prices in major cities soared.  We argue that the speed and efficacy of China's stimulus derives
from state control over its banking system and corporate sector.  Beijing ordered state-owned banks
to lend, and they lent.  Beijing ordered centrally-controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest,
and they invested.  However, our data show that much of this investment was highly leveraged purchases
of real estate.  Residential land auction prices in eight major cities rose about 100% in 2009, controlling
for quality variation.  Moreover, higher price rises occur these SOEs are more active buyers.  We argue
that these centrally-controlled SOEs overbid substantially, fueling a real estate bubble; and that China's
seemingly highly effective macroeconomic stimulus package may well have induced costly resource
misallocation.
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1. ﾠ  ﾠ Introduction ﾠ
The ﾠ 2008 ﾠ financial ﾠ crisis ﾠ that ﾠ originated ﾠ in ﾠ the ﾠ U.S. ﾠ triggered ﾠ a ﾠ global ﾠ recession. ﾠ  ﾠ
Central ﾠbanks ﾠand ﾠgovernments ﾠworldwide ﾠreacted ﾠwith ﾠmonetary ﾠand ﾠfiscal ﾠpolicy ﾠ
interventions. ﾠ  ﾠ Researchers ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠBrookings ﾠInstitute ﾠestimate ﾠfiscal ﾠstimuli ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠ
G-ﾭ‐20 ﾠcountries ﾠreaching ﾠUS$692 ﾠbillion ﾠin ﾠ2009 ﾠʹ ﾠroughly ﾠ1.4% ﾠof ﾠtheir ﾠcombined ﾠ
2008 ﾠgross ﾠdomestic ﾠproduct ﾠ(GDP) ﾠand ﾠabout ﾠ1.1% ﾠof ﾠglobal ﾠGDP ﾠ(Prasad ﾠand ﾠSorkin ﾠ
2009). ﾠ  ﾠ IMF ﾠ (International ﾠ Monetary ﾠ Fund ﾠ 2009) ﾠ estimates ﾠ are ﾠ similar, ﾠ and ﾠ peg ﾠ
China's ﾠpackage ﾠat ﾠabout ﾠ2% ﾠof ﾠits ﾠ2009 ﾠGDP. ﾠ
These ﾠgovernment ﾠactions ﾠrenewed ﾠdebate ﾠabout ﾠthe ﾠefficacy ﾠof ﾠsuch ﾠstimuli ﾠ
as ﾠremedies ﾠfor ﾠrecession. ﾠ  ﾠ Feldstein ﾠ(2009) ﾠsees ﾠcredit ﾠmarkets ﾠin ﾠU.S. ﾠand ﾠsome ﾠ
other ﾠdeveloped ﾠcountries ﾠas ﾠtoo ﾠdeeply ﾠwounded ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠsubprime ﾠmortgage ﾠcrisis ﾠ
to ﾠbe ﾠable ﾠ(or ﾠwilling) ﾠto ﾠadvance ﾠcredit ﾠin ﾠresponse ﾠto ﾠinterest ﾠrate ﾠreductions ﾠby ﾠ
monetary ﾠauthorities. ﾠ  ﾠ If ﾠso, ﾠmonetary ﾠstimulation ﾠalone ﾠought ﾠnot ﾠto ﾠwork, ﾠeven ﾠin ﾠ
the ﾠshort-ﾭ‐run. ﾠ ﾠWhen ﾠmonetary ﾠpolicy's ﾠeffectiveness ﾠis ﾠuncertain, ﾠfiscal ﾠstimuli ﾠʹ ﾠ
tax ﾠ cuts, ﾠ government ﾠ spending ﾠ hikes, ﾠ or ﾠ both ﾠ -ﾭ‐ ﾠ can ﾠ come ﾠ to ﾠ the ﾠ rescue ﾠ if ﾠ the ﾠ
Keynesian ﾠ multiplier ﾠ exceeds ﾠ one. ﾠ  ﾠ Christine ﾠ Romer, ﾠ the ﾠ chair ﾠ of ﾠ U.S. ﾠ President ﾠ
Obama's ﾠ Council ﾠ of ﾠ Economic ﾠ Advisers, ﾠ estimates ﾠ the ﾠ U.S. ﾠ stimulus ﾠ achieving ﾠ a ﾠ
multiplier ﾠof ﾠabout ﾠ1.6,
1 ﾠ but ﾠother ﾠprominent ﾠeconomists, ﾠsuch ﾠas ﾠRobert ﾠBarro
2 ﾠ
and ﾠJohn ﾠCochrane
3, ﾠestimate ﾠa ﾠmultiplier ﾠbelow ﾠone. ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
1 ﾠ Christine ﾠRomer. ﾠ"On ﾠthe ﾠAdvance ﾠEstimate ﾠof ﾠGDP ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠFourth ﾠQuarter ﾠof ﾠ2009," ﾠJan ﾠ29, ﾠ2010. ﾠ
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/01/29/advance-ﾭ‐estimate-ﾭ‐gdp-ﾭ‐fourth-ﾭ‐quarter-ﾭ‐2009. ﾠ. ﾠ
2 ﾠ Robert ﾠBarro, ﾠ"The ﾠStimulus ﾠEvidence ﾠOne ﾠYear ﾠOn," ﾠWall ﾠStreet ﾠJournal, ﾠFeb ﾠ23, ﾠ2010. ﾠ  ﾠ
3 ﾠ John ﾠH. ﾠCochrane, ﾠ"Fiscal ﾠStimulus, ﾠFiscal ﾠInflation, ﾠor ﾠFiscal ﾠFallacies?" ﾠFeb ﾠ27, ﾠ2009. ﾠ
faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/Papers/fiscal2.htm. ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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 ﾠ
The ﾠ literature ﾠ provides ﾠ mixed ﾠ theoretical ﾠ and ﾠ empirical ﾠ evidence ﾠ on ﾠ the ﾠ
efficacy ﾠ of ﾠ stimulus ﾠ packages ﾠ in ﾠ developed ﾠ economies. ﾠ ﾠEarly ﾠ empirical ﾠ work ﾠ
reports ﾠ multipliers ﾠ above ﾠ one ﾠ (Rotemberg ﾠ and ﾠ Woodford ﾠ 1992; ﾠ Blandchard ﾠ and ﾠ
Perotti ﾠ 2002; ﾠ Gali, ﾠ Lopez-ﾭ‐Salido ﾠ and ﾠ Valles ﾠ 2007), ﾠ but ﾠ more ﾠ recent ﾠ work ﾠ reports ﾠ
multipliers ﾠnear ﾠor ﾠbelow ﾠunity, ﾠchallenging ﾠthe ﾠwisdom ﾠof ﾠall ﾠthe ﾠrecent ﾠgovernment ﾠ
stimuli. ﾠ  ﾠ Barro ﾠand ﾠRedlick ﾠ(2009) ﾠdiscount ﾠearlier ﾠmultiplier ﾠestimates ﾠas ﾠbiased ﾠ
because ﾠof ﾠbusiness ﾠcycle ﾠendogeneity, ﾠand ﾠargue ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠfocus ﾠon ﾠdefense ﾠspending ﾠ
allows ﾠa ﾠcleaner ﾠestimate ﾠʹ ﾠwhich ﾠturns ﾠout ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠbelow ﾠone ﾠunder ﾠmost ﾠconditions. ﾠ  ﾠ
This ﾠaccords ﾠwith ﾠestimates ﾠby ﾠEdelberg, ﾠEichenbaum ﾠand ﾠFisher ﾠ(1999), ﾠBurnside, ﾠ
Eichenbaum ﾠand ﾠFisher ﾠ(2004), ﾠand ﾠothers. ﾠ  ﾠ Ramey ﾠ(2009) ﾠestimates ﾠthe ﾠmultiplier ﾠ
as ﾠlying ﾠbetween ﾠ0.6 ﾠand ﾠ1.1, ﾠand ﾠcriticizes ﾠlarger ﾠestimates ﾠas ﾠbiased ﾠdue ﾠto ﾠmodel ﾠ
misspecification. ﾠ  ﾠ Freedman ﾠet ﾠal. ﾠ(2009) ﾠshow ﾠa ﾠwide ﾠrange ﾠof ﾠshort-ﾭ‐run ﾠ(two ﾠyears) ﾠ
multipliers, ﾠranging ﾠfrom ﾠ0.2 ﾠto ﾠ2.2 ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠUnited ﾠStates; ﾠbut ﾠstress ﾠthat ﾠgovernment ﾠ
spending ﾠhikes ﾠalmost ﾠalways ﾠbeget ﾠfiscal ﾠdeficits ﾠand ﾠtherefore ﾠreduce ﾠlong ﾠrun ﾠ
output. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ efficacy ﾠ of ﾠ tax ﾠ cuts ﾠ is ﾠ also ﾠ uncertain. ﾠ  ﾠ Barro ﾠ and ﾠ Redlick ﾠ (2009) ﾠ
estimate ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠone ﾠpercentage ﾠpoint ﾠcut ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠmean ﾠmarginal ﾠtax ﾠrate ﾠraises ﾠthe ﾠ
subsequent ﾠ year's ﾠ GDP ﾠ growth ﾠ rate ﾠ by ﾠ about ﾠ 0.6%. ﾠ  ﾠ However, ﾠ Feldstein ﾠ (2009) ﾠ
estimates ﾠa ﾠmuch ﾠweaker ﾠresponse ﾠ-ﾭ‐ ﾠa ﾠmarginal ﾠpropensity ﾠto ﾠconsume ﾠfrom ﾠtax ﾠcuts ﾠ
of ﾠonly ﾠ0.13. ﾠ  ﾠ Debates ﾠin ﾠother ﾠcountries ﾠecho ﾠthat ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠU.S. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
The ﾠChinese ﾠgovernment's ﾠstimulus ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠwake ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ2008 ﾠcrisis ﾠwrought ﾠa ﾠ
large ﾠand ﾠalmost ﾠimmediate ﾠresponse. ﾠ  ﾠ Beijing ﾠannounced ﾠits ﾠstimulus ﾠpackage ﾠin ﾠ
the ﾠ4
th ﾠquarter ﾠin ﾠ2008 ﾠand ﾠannualized ﾠreal ﾠGDP ﾠgrowth ﾠrates ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠfour ﾠquarters ﾠof ﾠ ﾠ
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2009 ﾠrose ﾠsteadily ﾠand ﾠsubstantially: ﾠ6.2%, ﾠ7.9%, ﾠ9.1% ﾠand ﾠ10.7%, ﾠrespectively; ﾠand ﾠ
11.9% ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ2010. ﾠ  ﾠ
China's ﾠstimulus ﾠcontained ﾠboth ﾠmonetary ﾠand ﾠfiscal ﾠelements. ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠthe ﾠ4
th ﾠ
quarter ﾠ of ﾠ 2008, ﾠ the ﾠ government ﾠ announced ﾠ a ﾠ monetary ﾠ policy ﾠ shift ﾠ from ﾠ
"moderately ﾠtight" ﾠto ﾠ"moderately ﾠloose". ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠannualized ﾠreal ﾠmoney ﾠsupply ﾠ(M2) ﾠ
growth ﾠrate ﾠrose ﾠfrom ﾠ14.9% ﾠin ﾠ2008 ﾠQ4 ﾠto ﾠ26.2% ﾠin ﾠ2009 ﾠQ1 ﾠand ﾠthen ﾠ30.4% ﾠin ﾠ
2009 ﾠQ2, ﾠwhile ﾠthe ﾠannualized ﾠreal ﾠgrowth ﾠrate ﾠin ﾠtotal ﾠloan ﾠbalances ﾠrose ﾠfrom ﾠ13.1% ﾠ
to ﾠ 27.9% ﾠ and ﾠ then ﾠ 33.9% ﾠ in ﾠ the ﾠ same ﾠ intervals ﾠ (Figure ﾠ 1). ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠ comparison, ﾠ the ﾠ
average ﾠ real ﾠ annual ﾠ growth ﾠ rates ﾠ in ﾠ M2 ﾠ and ﾠ loan ﾠ balances ﾠ from ﾠ 2000 ﾠ to ﾠ 2008 ﾠ
averaged ﾠ 14.5% ﾠ and ﾠ 11.8%, ﾠ respectively. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ fiscal ﾠ stimulus, ﾠ a ﾠ government ﾠ
spending ﾠpackage ﾠof ﾠRMB4 ﾠtrillion ﾠ(about ﾠUS$586 ﾠbillion) ﾠbegan ﾠin ﾠNovember ﾠ2008 ﾠ
and ﾠwas ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠspent ﾠover ﾠthe ﾠnext ﾠtwo ﾠto ﾠthree ﾠyears.
4 ﾠ  ﾠ Thereafter, ﾠthe ﾠannualized ﾠ
real ﾠgrowth ﾠrate ﾠin ﾠfixed ﾠcapital ﾠassets ﾠinvestment ﾠrose ﾠfrom ﾠ20.27% ﾠin ﾠ2008 ﾠQ4 ﾠto ﾠ
29.42% ﾠin ﾠ2009 ﾠQ1 ﾠand ﾠthen ﾠ38.03% ﾠin ﾠ2009 ﾠQ2 ﾠ(Figure ﾠ2). ﾠ  ﾠ Gross ﾠcapital ﾠformation ﾠ
contributed ﾠover ﾠ90% ﾠ(a ﾠhistoric ﾠpeak) ﾠof ﾠChina's ﾠGDP ﾠgrowth ﾠin ﾠ2009.
5 ﾠ
===Insert ﾠFigure ﾠ1 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
===Insert ﾠFigure ﾠ2 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
4 ﾠ Actual ﾠspending ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠChinese ﾠcentral ﾠgovernment ﾠmay ﾠwell ﾠbe ﾠless ﾠthan ﾠannounced ﾠfigures. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ
official ﾠfigure ﾠfor ﾠ2009, ﾠannounced ﾠin ﾠa ﾠMarch ﾠ2010 ﾠspeech ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠNational ﾠPeoples' ﾠCongress ﾠby ﾠ
Premier ﾠWen ﾠJiaobao, ﾠis ﾠonly ﾠRMB924.3 ﾠbillion ﾠ(ca ﾠUS$135.4 ﾠbillion). ﾠ  ﾠ Even ﾠthis ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠtoo ﾠhigh: ﾠ
Prasad ﾠand ﾠSorkin ﾠ(2009) ﾠestimate ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠcentral ﾠgovernment ﾠspent ﾠonly ﾠUS$90.1 ﾠbillion ﾠthat ﾠyear. ﾠ
5 ﾠ Source: ﾠNational ﾠBureau ﾠof ﾠStatistics, ﾠ͞2010 ﾠStatistics ﾠYearbook ﾠof ﾠChina͟. ﾠ  ﾠ . ﾠ ﾠ
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The ﾠ sheer ﾠ magnitudes ﾠ of ﾠ China's ﾠ stimulus ﾠ package ﾠ do ﾠ not ﾠ explain ﾠ its ﾠ
remarkable ﾠimpact. ﾠ  ﾠ China's ﾠmonetary ﾠpolicy ﾠwas ﾠnot ﾠdistinctly ﾠextreme: ﾠits ﾠlowest ﾠ
benchmark ﾠinterest ﾠrate ﾠduring ﾠthe ﾠdownturn ﾠperiod ﾠwas ﾠ2.25%, ﾠand ﾠthis ﾠwas ﾠnot ﾠ
lower ﾠthan ﾠin ﾠmost ﾠother ﾠeconomies. ﾠ  ﾠ Prasad ﾠand ﾠSorkin ﾠ(2009) ﾠclassify ﾠthe ﾠfiscal ﾠ
stimulus ﾠpackages ﾠof ﾠChina, ﾠSaudi ﾠArabia, ﾠSouth ﾠAfrica, ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠUnited ﾠStates ﾠas ﾠ
"large" ﾠ compared ﾠ to ﾠ those ﾠ of ﾠ other ﾠ G20 ﾠ countries; ﾠ but ﾠ estimate ﾠ America's ﾠ fiscal ﾠ
stimulus, ﾠUS$841.2 ﾠbillion ﾠor ﾠ5.9% ﾠof ﾠGDP, ﾠdwarfing ﾠChina's ﾠcomparatively ﾠpaltry ﾠ
US$204.3 ﾠbillion ﾠor ﾠ4.8% ﾠof ﾠGDP. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠIMF ﾠ(2009) ﾠestimates ﾠare ﾠmore ﾠcomparable: ﾠ
4.8% ﾠand ﾠ4.4% ﾠof ﾠGDP ﾠfor ﾠAmerica's ﾠĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ͛Ɛfiscal ﾠstimuli, ﾠrespectively. ﾠ  ﾠ Thus ﾠ
China's ﾠ fiscal ﾠ stimulus ﾠ was ﾠ clearly ﾠ not ﾠ larger ﾠ than ﾠ America's, ﾠ and ﾠ was ﾠ probably ﾠ
somewhat ﾠsmaller. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
China's ﾠeconomic ﾠstrength ﾠcoming ﾠout ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠglobal ﾠrecession ﾠis ﾠalso ﾠclearly ﾠ
not ﾠ due ﾠ to ﾠ an ﾠ undervaluation ﾠ of ﾠ its ﾠ currency ﾠ stimulating ﾠ exports. ﾠ  ﾠ Despite ﾠ the ﾠ
recent ﾠdebate ﾠover ﾠChina's ﾠexchange ﾠrate ﾠpolicy, ﾠand ﾠirrespective ﾠof ﾠwhether ﾠor ﾠnot ﾠ
a ﾠlow ﾠRMB ﾠsubsidizes ﾠexports, ﾠChinese ﾠnet ﾠexports ﾠfell ﾠ44.8% ﾠin ﾠ2009. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠChinese ﾠ
government ﾠestimates ﾠthat ﾠthis ﾠcontracted ﾠthe ﾠeconomy ﾠby ﾠroughly ﾠ3.9% ﾠof ﾠGDP.
6 ﾠ ﾠ
Thus, ﾠ China's ﾠ stimulus ﾠ package ﾠ took ﾠ effect ﾠ as ﾠ the ﾠ country's ﾠ exports ﾠ were ﾠ falling ﾠ
precipitously. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
We ﾠoffer ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠexplanation ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠeffectiveness ﾠof ﾠChina's ﾠstimulus ﾠpackage ﾠ
based ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠcorporate ﾠgovernance ﾠof ﾠits ﾠbanks ﾠand ﾠmajor ﾠnon-ﾭ‐financial ﾠenterprises. ﾠ  ﾠ
Specifically, ﾠ we ﾠ propose ﾠ that ﾠ the ﾠ extraordinarily ﾠ fast ﾠ and ﾠ large ﾠ response ﾠ to ﾠ the ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
6 ﾠ Source: ﾠNational ﾠBureau ﾠof ﾠStatistics, ﾠ͞2010 ﾠStatistics ﾠYearbook ﾠof ﾠChina͟. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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government's ﾠstimulus ﾠpolicies ﾠreflects ﾠthe ﾠcentral ﾠgovernment's ﾠdirect ﾠcontrol ﾠover ﾠ
major ﾠ banks ﾠ and ﾠ largest ﾠ non-ﾭ‐financial ﾠ enterprises, ﾠ all ﾠ of ﾠ which ﾠ are ﾠ state-ﾭ‐owned ﾠ
enterprises ﾠ (SOEs). ﾠ  ﾠ China's ﾠ SOE ﾠ banks ﾠ increased ﾠ lending ﾠ dramatically ﾠ and ﾠ
immediately ﾠ upon ﾠ the ﾠ government's ﾠ announcement ﾠ of ﾠ its ﾠ stimulus ﾠ policies, ﾠ and ﾠ
China's ﾠstate-ﾭ‐owned ﾠnon-ﾭ‐financial ﾠenterprises ﾠlaunched ﾠvast ﾠnew ﾠinvestment ﾠplans ﾠ
at ﾠexactly ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠtime. ﾠ  ﾠ
We ﾠargue ﾠthat ﾠthese ﾠlending ﾠand ﾠinvestment ﾠdecisions ﾠgenerally ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠseek ﾠ
to ﾠ optimize ﾠ the ﾠ firm-ﾭ‐ůĞǀĞů ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ŽĨ ŚŝŶĂ͛Ɛ ďĂŶŬŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ŶŽŶĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
SOEs, ﾠ as ﾠ microeconomic ﾠ theory ﾠ posits ﾠ should ﾠ occur ﾠ in ﾠ a ﾠ market ﾠ economy. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
Rather, ﾠ they ﾠ reflect ﾠ direct ﾠ political ﾠ control ﾠ by ﾠ the ﾠ government ﾠ over ﾠ banks ﾠ and ﾠ
corporate ﾠborrowers. ﾠ  ﾠ If ﾠso, ﾠthe ﾠspeed ﾠand ﾠefficacy ﾠof ﾠChina's ﾠstimulus ﾠpolicies ﾠmay ﾠ
well ﾠbe ﾠpart ﾠof ﾠwhat ﾠis ﾠsometimes ﾠcalled ﾠthe ﾠ"policy ﾠburden" ﾠ(Lin, ﾠCai ﾠand ﾠLi, ﾠ1998; ﾠ
Lin ﾠand ﾠTan, ﾠ1999; ﾠLin ﾠand ﾠLi, ﾠ2008) ﾠor ﾠ"multitasking" ﾠ(Bai ﾠet ﾠal, ﾠ2000; ﾠBai, ﾠLu ﾠand ﾠTao, ﾠ
2006) ﾠthe ﾠgovernment ﾠassigns ﾠto ﾠSOEs. ﾠ  ﾠ Such ﾠdirect ﾠintervention ﾠin ﾠbank ﾠlending ﾠ
and ﾠcorporate ﾠinvestment ﾠdecisions ﾠmay ﾠlet ﾠChina's ﾠgovernment ﾠlift ﾠits ﾠeconomy ﾠout ﾠ
of ﾠa ﾠlow-ﾭ‐level ﾠequilibrium ﾠmore ﾠneatly ﾠthan ﾠother ﾠcountries ﾠcould ﾠmanage. ﾠ  ﾠ But ﾠthe ﾠ
drafting ﾠof ﾠbanks ﾠand ﾠnon-ﾭ‐financial ﾠin ﾠa ﾠforced ﾠmarch ﾠtowards ﾠhigher ﾠGDP ﾠmay ﾠalso ﾠ
misallocate ﾠcapital, ﾠinducing ﾠa ﾠrecovery ﾠwithout ﾠlasting ﾠeconomic ﾠfoundations. ﾠ
Major ﾠ lending ﾠ initiatives ﾠ require ﾠ substantial ﾠ due ﾠ diligence ﾠ and ﾠ financial ﾠ
analysis ﾠby ﾠbanks, ﾠand ﾠmajor ﾠcapital ﾠspending ﾠinitiatives ﾠentail ﾠsubstantial ﾠplanning ﾠ
and ﾠ preparation ﾠ by ﾠ enterprises. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠ requires ﾠ expertise, ﾠ time, ﾠ and ﾠ resources ﾠ ʹ ﾠ
especially ﾠin ﾠa ﾠrapidly ﾠchanging ﾠeconomic ﾠenvironment. ﾠ  ﾠ Ordered ﾠto ﾠboost ﾠlending, ﾠ ﾠ
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 ﾠ
China's ﾠSOE ﾠbank ﾠmanagers ﾠwere ﾠunderstandably ﾠreluctant ﾠto ﾠlend ﾠto ﾠprivate-ﾭ‐sector ﾠ
entrepreneurs, ﾠ and ﾠ so ﾠ proffered ﾠ loans ﾠ to ﾠ nonfinancial ﾠ SOEs, ﾠ whose ﾠ official ﾠ
connections ﾠsubstantially ﾠreduce ﾠtheir ﾠperceived ﾠdefault ﾠrisk. ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
Major ﾠcapital ﾠinvestment ﾠoutlays ﾠalso ﾠrequire ﾠintricate ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit ﾠstudies, ﾠ
forecasts ﾠof ﾠimportant ﾠparameters ﾠlike ﾠdemand ﾠand ﾠfactor ﾠcosts, ﾠand ﾠrisk ﾠanalysis. ﾠ  ﾠ
This ﾠ too ﾠ requires ﾠ expertise, ﾠ time, ﾠ and ﾠ resources ﾠ ʹ ﾠ especially ﾠ in ﾠ an ﾠ uncertain ﾠ
economic ﾠenvironment. ﾠ  ﾠ China's ﾠSOE ﾠmanagers, ﾠordered ﾠto ﾠboost ﾠinvestment, ﾠwere ﾠ
understandably ﾠ hesitant ﾠ to ﾠ make ﾠ intrinsically ﾠ largely ﾠ irreversible ﾠ investments ﾠ in ﾠ
property, ﾠ plant, ﾠ and ﾠ equipment. ﾠ  ﾠ Instead ﾠ they ﾠ needed ﾠ quick ﾠ and ﾠ reversible ﾠ
investments. ﾠ  ﾠ We ﾠ show ﾠ that ﾠ they ﾠ poured ﾠ the ﾠ proceeds ﾠ of ﾠ their ﾠ loans ﾠ from ﾠ SOE ﾠ
banks ﾠinto ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠpurchases, ﾠwhich ﾠcount ﾠas ﾠcorporate ﾠinvestments ﾠin ﾠofficial ﾠ
statistics. ﾠ
Consistent ﾠwith ﾠthis, ﾠthe ﾠState-ﾭ‐owned ﾠAssets ﾠSupervision ﾠand ﾠAdministration ﾠ
Commission ﾠ(SASAC) ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠ(federal ﾠgovernment) ﾠreports ﾠnumerous ﾠ
SOEs, ﾠ especially ﾠ very ﾠ large ﾠ SOEs ﾠ controlled ﾠ directly ﾠ by ﾠ the ﾠ central ﾠ government ﾠ
(hereinafter ﾠ"C-ﾭ‐SOEs"), ﾠsuddenly ﾠexpanding ﾠhousing ﾠdevelopment ﾠactivities ﾠin ﾠ2009. ﾠ  ﾠ
Using ﾠparcel-ﾭ‐level ﾠland ﾠauction ﾠdata, ﾠand ﾠadjusting ﾠfor ﾠparcel ﾠquality ﾠusing ﾠlocation ﾠ
and ﾠphysical ﾠattribute ﾠdata, ﾠwe ﾠfind ﾠa ﾠ97.4% ﾠincrease ﾠin ﾠ real ﾠland ﾠprices ﾠin ﾠeight ﾠ
major ﾠChinese ﾠcities ﾠin ﾠ2009. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠfraction ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠtotal ﾠvalue ﾠof ﾠresidential ﾠland ﾠ
purchases ﾠmade ﾠby ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠjumped ﾠfrom ﾠ15% ﾠprior ﾠto ﾠ2008 ﾠto ﾠ23% ﾠin ﾠ2009 ﾠand ﾠ33% ﾠ
in ﾠ2010 ﾠQ1. ﾠ ﾠWe ﾠfurther ﾠestimate ﾠthat, ﾠcontrolling ﾠfor ﾠland ﾠparcel ﾠattributes ﾠand ﾠ
time ﾠfixed ﾠeffects, ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠpaid ﾠ16% ﾠmore ﾠthan ﾠother ﾠland ﾠbuyers. ﾠ  ﾠ Moreover, ﾠthese ﾠ ﾠ
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effects ﾠare ﾠevident ﾠafter ﾠthe ﾠgovernment's ﾠstimulus ﾠpackage ﾠannouncement, ﾠbut ﾠnot ﾠ
before. ﾠ  ﾠ These ﾠ findings ﾠ are ﾠ consistent ﾠ with ﾠ C-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠ overpaying ﾠ for ﾠ land ﾠ in ﾠ a ﾠ
scramble ﾠto ﾠinvest ﾠquickly ﾠʹ ﾠthough ﾠthe ﾠbid ﾠpremium ﾠassociated ﾠwith ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs' ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠ
partially ﾠattributable ﾠto ﾠlower ﾠcapital ﾠcosts, ﾠand ﾠmight ﾠalso ﾠbe ﾠjustifiable ﾠin ﾠthat ﾠtheir ﾠ
political ﾠ connections ﾠ might ﾠ let ﾠ C-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠ glean ﾠ greater ﾠ revenue ﾠ from ﾠ development ﾠ
projects ﾠthan ﾠother ﾠdevelopers ﾠcould. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
The ﾠ paper ﾠ proceeds ﾠ as ﾠ follows. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ next ﾠ section ﾠ summarizes ﾠ the ﾠ
institutional ﾠbackground ﾠof ﾠbanks, ﾠmost ﾠof ﾠwhich ﾠare ﾠSOEs, ﾠand ﾠnonfinancial ﾠSOEs ﾠin ﾠ
China, ﾠincluding ﾠvarious ﾠreforms ﾠand ﾠtheir ﾠcurrent ﾠstatus. ﾠ  ﾠ Section ﾠ3 ﾠdiscusses ﾠthe ﾠ
banks ﾠ and ﾠ SOEs' ﾠ rolethe ﾠ roles ﾠ of ﾠ banking ﾠ and ﾠ nonfinancial ﾠ SOEs ﾠ in ﾠ the ﾠ stimulus ﾠ
policies, ﾠand ﾠargues ﾠthat ﾠan ﾠSOE ﾠchannel ﾠis ﾠimportant ﾠto ﾠChinese ﾠmacroeconomic ﾠ
policy. ﾠ  ﾠ Section ﾠ 4 ﾠ introduces ﾠ the ﾠ land ﾠ transaction ﾠ data ﾠ for ﾠ empirical ﾠ tests, ﾠ and ﾠ
section ﾠ5 ﾠdiscusses ﾠour ﾠempirical ﾠresults ﾠlinking ﾠSOEs' ﾠbidding ﾠto ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠprices. ﾠ  ﾠ
Section ﾠ6 ﾠdiscusses ﾠthe ﾠsocial ﾠand ﾠeconomic ﾠimplications ﾠof ﾠSOEs' ﾠbidding ﾠbehavior ﾠin ﾠ
land ﾠmarket. ﾠ  ﾠ Section ﾠ7 ﾠconcludes. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ
2. ﾠ  ﾠ Institutional ﾠ Background ﾠ Regarding ﾠ Chinese ﾠ Banks ﾠ and ﾠ Large ﾠ
Non-ﾭ‐financial ﾠEnterprises ﾠ
2.1 ﾠ  ﾠ Recent ﾠSOE ﾠReform ﾠPolicies ﾠ  ﾠ
Since ﾠthe ﾠfounding ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠPeople's ﾠRepublic ﾠof ﾠChina ﾠin ﾠ1949, ﾠor ﾠmore ﾠprecisely, ﾠsince ﾠ
the ﾠ completion ﾠ of ﾠ its ﾠ "Socialist ﾠ Transformation" ﾠ in ﾠ 1956, ﾠ SOEs' ﾠ domination ﾠ in ﾠ all ﾠ ﾠ
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industrial ﾠsectors ﾠhas ﾠbeen ﾠa ﾠkey ﾠelement ﾠof ﾠSocialism. ﾠ  ﾠ From ﾠ1956 ﾠuntil ﾠthe ﾠrecent ﾠ
reform ﾠera, ﾠindustrial ﾠfacilities ﾠwere ﾠparts ﾠof ﾠvarious ﾠgovernment ﾠministries, ﾠand ﾠthus ﾠ
integral ﾠ parts ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ central, ﾠ provincial, ﾠ municipal, ﾠ or ﾠ local ﾠ district ﾠ governments. ﾠ  ﾠ
Managers ﾠwere ﾠappointed ﾠgovernment ﾠbureaucrats ﾠcharged ﾠwith ﾠfollowing ﾠCentral ﾠ
Plans ﾠ and ﾠ occasional ﾠ direct ﾠ orders ﾠ from ﾠ higher ﾠ levels ﾠ of ﾠ government ﾠ or ﾠ Party ﾠ
officials.
7 ﾠ ﾠIn ﾠ1978, ﾠwhen ﾠeconomic ﾠreforms ﾠbegan, ﾠSOEs ﾠaccounted ﾠfor ﾠ78% ﾠof ﾠtotal ﾠ
industrial ﾠ output ﾠ and ﾠ 64% ﾠ of ﾠ urban ﾠ employment, ﾠ and ﾠ during ﾠ 1975-ﾭ‐1980 ﾠ SOEs ﾠ
accounted ﾠfor ﾠover ﾠ84% ﾠof ﾠnew ﾠinvestment ﾠin ﾠindustrial ﾠfixed ﾠassets ﾠ(Chiu ﾠand ﾠLewis, ﾠ
2006; ﾠBrandt, ﾠRawski ﾠand ﾠSutton, ﾠ2008).
8 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
After ﾠthe ﾠmid-ﾭ‐1980s, ﾠreforming ﾠSOEs ﾠbecame ﾠa ﾠmajor ﾠpolicy ﾠfocus, ﾠand ﾠactual ﾠ
reforms ﾠ occurred ﾠ in ﾠ three ﾠ phases. ﾠ  ﾠ We ﾠ briefly ﾠ review ﾠ the ﾠ first ﾠ two, ﾠ which ﾠ are ﾠ
discussed ﾠin ﾠdetail ﾠelsewhere ﾠ(e.g. ﾠQian, ﾠ2000; ﾠChiu ﾠand ﾠLewis, ﾠ2006; ﾠBrandt, ﾠRawski ﾠ
and ﾠSutton, ﾠ2008). ﾠ  ﾠ Our ﾠfocus ﾠis ﾠthe ﾠthird ﾠphase, ﾠwhich ﾠclarifies ﾠSOEs' ﾠrole ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠ
government ﾠstimulus ﾠpackages. ﾠ
The ﾠ first ﾠ phase, ﾠ from ﾠ the ﾠ mid-ﾭ‐1980s ﾠ to ﾠ the ﾠ mid-ﾭ‐1990s, ﾠ expanded ﾠ SOE ﾠ
autonomy ﾠ and ﾠ surrounded ﾠ CEOs ﾠ with ﾠ incentives. ﾠ  ﾠ First, ﾠ a ﾠ "dual-ﾭ‐track ﾠ approach" ﾠ
(shuang ﾠgui ﾠzhi) ﾠlet ﾠSOEs ﾠproduce ﾠbeyond ﾠtheir ﾠquotas, ﾠsell ﾠthe ﾠexcess ﾠat ﾠmarket ﾠ
prices, ﾠand ﾠkeep ﾠthe ﾠproceeds ﾠof ﾠthis ﾠas ﾠcorporate ﾠprofits, ﾠwhile ﾠthe ﾠgovernment ﾠ
continued ﾠsetting ﾠquotas. ﾠ  ﾠ Later, ﾠa ﾠ"contract ﾠresponsibility ﾠsystem" ﾠ(cheng ﾠbao ﾠzhi) ﾠ
was ﾠintroduced ﾠto ﾠmost ﾠsmall-ﾭ‐ ﾠand ﾠmedium-ﾭ‐size ﾠSOEs, ﾠunder ﾠwhich ﾠSOE ﾠmanagers ﾠ
signed ﾠ contracts ﾠ with ﾠ the ﾠ government. ﾠ  ﾠ These ﾠ gave ﾠ managers ﾠ considerable ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
7 ﾠ For ﾠmore ﾠdetails ﾠabout ﾠSOEs ﾠduring ﾠthe ﾠplanned ﾠeconomy ﾠera, ﾠsee ﾠChiu ﾠand ﾠLewis ﾠ(2006) ﾠand ﾠBrandt, ﾠ
Rawski ﾠand ﾠSutton ﾠ(2008). ﾠ  ﾠ
8 ﾠ Most ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠremaining ﾠwas ﾠby ﾠlocal ﾠgovernment-ﾭ‐controlled ﾠcollectives. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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autonomy ﾠin ﾠrunning ﾠtheir ﾠSOEs, ﾠbut ﾠthe ﾠenterprises ﾠremained ﾠwholly ﾠowned ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠ
State. ﾠ  ﾠ Profits ﾠwere ﾠshared ﾠbetween ﾠthe ﾠenterprises ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠaccording ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠ
contracts. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
The ﾠsecond ﾠphase ﾠof ﾠSOE ﾠreforms ﾠstarted ﾠin ﾠ1994 ﾠand ﾠfocused ﾠon ﾠownership. ﾠ  ﾠ
Guided ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠslogan ﾠ"grasp ﾠthe ﾠbig, ﾠlet ﾠgo ﾠthe ﾠsmall" ﾠ(zhua ﾠda ﾠfang ﾠxiao), ﾠmany ﾠ
small-ﾭ‐ ﾠand ﾠmedium-ﾭ‐size ﾠSOEs ﾠwere ﾠassessed ﾠfor ﾠreorganization, ﾠbankruptcy, ﾠdebt ﾠ
write-ﾭ‐offs, ﾠ merger ﾠ into ﾠ partnerships, ﾠ leasing, ﾠ contractual ﾠ operation, ﾠ or ﾠ sales. ﾠ  ﾠ
Larger ﾠ SOEs ﾠ remained ﾠ state-ﾭ‐owned ﾠ as ﾠ a ﾠ shareholding ﾠ system ﾠ was ﾠ introduced. ﾠ  ﾠ
Some ﾠmore ﾠprofitable ﾠenterprises ﾠwere ﾠeven ﾠencouraged ﾠto ﾠlist ﾠminority ﾠpublic ﾠfloats ﾠ
on ﾠdomestic ﾠor ﾠinternational ﾠstock ﾠexchanges. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
Despite ﾠSOEs, ﾠespecially ﾠlarge ﾠones, ﾠhaving ﾠprivileged ﾠaccess ﾠto ﾠinputs, ﾠcapital, ﾠ
and ﾠmarkets; ﾠmany ﾠcontinued ﾠperforming ﾠpoorly ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠend ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ20
th ﾠcentury ﾠʹ ﾠ
most ﾠlikely ﾠbecause ﾠof ﾠa ﾠmixture ﾠof ﾠpoor ﾠgovernance, ﾠunder-ﾭ‐developed ﾠmanagement ﾠ
skills, ﾠand ﾠheavy ﾠ"policy ﾠburdens" ﾠthat ﾠcommandeered ﾠSOEs ﾠto ﾠfulfill ﾠgovernment ﾠ
policy ﾠagendas, ﾠdistorting ﾠtheir ﾠproduction ﾠdecisions ﾠand ﾠgeneral ﾠoperations ﾠ(Lin ﾠand ﾠ
Tan, ﾠ1999; ﾠLin ﾠand ﾠLi, ﾠ2008). ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠcentral ﾠgovernment ﾠbilled ﾠthe ﾠdecade ﾠfrom ﾠ1993 ﾠ
to ﾠ 2002 ﾠ as ﾠ "the ﾠ most ﾠ difficult ﾠ period ﾠ for ﾠ the ﾠ SOEs."
9 ﾠ ﾠDuring ﾠ the ﾠ economic ﾠ
downturn ﾠof ﾠ1998, ﾠmore ﾠthan ﾠtwo ﾠthirds ﾠof ﾠindustrial ﾠSOEs ﾠran ﾠdeficits, ﾠand ﾠSOEs' ﾠ
country-ﾭ‐wide ﾠ mean ﾠ return ﾠ on ﾠ assets ﾠ (ROA) ﾠ was ﾠ only ﾠ about ﾠ 0.7%.
10 ﾠ ﾠSOEs ﾠ were ﾠ
called ﾠthe ﾠ"Achilles ﾠheel ﾠof ﾠChina's ﾠotherwise ﾠremarkable ﾠeconomic ﾠperformance" ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
9 ﾠ Source: ﾠ"Thirty ﾠYears ﾠof ﾠSOE ﾠReform", ﾠhttp://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2008-ﾭ‐10/02/content_1110911.htm. ﾠ  ﾠ
10 ﾠ Source: ﾠNational ﾠBureau ﾠof ﾠStatistics, ﾠChina. ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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(Broadman, ﾠ 2001) ﾠ and ﾠ "threaten[ed] ﾠ to ﾠdrag ﾠdown ﾠ the ﾠ nation's ﾠ entire ﾠ economy" ﾠ
(Steinfeld, ﾠ1998). ﾠ
The ﾠthird ﾠphase ﾠof ﾠSOE ﾠreforms ﾠstarted ﾠin ﾠ2003, ﾠafter ﾠthe ﾠNovember ﾠ2002 ﾠ
16
th ﾠNational ﾠCongress ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠChinese ﾠCommunist ﾠParty ﾠ(CCP). ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠera ﾠis ﾠthe ﾠfocus ﾠ
of ﾠour ﾠstudy. ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠthis ﾠthird ﾠphase, ﾠthe ﾠgovernment ﾠset ﾠabout ﾠreforming ﾠproperty ﾠ
rights ﾠand ﾠcorporate ﾠgovernance ﾠin ﾠlarge ﾠSOEs. ﾠ  ﾠ One ﾠkey ﾠreform ﾠwas ﾠthe ﾠformation ﾠ
of ﾠa ﾠset ﾠof ﾠState-ﾭ‐owned ﾠAssets ﾠSupervision ﾠand ﾠAdministration ﾠCommissions ﾠ(SASACs) ﾠ
in ﾠMarch ﾠ2003 ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠPeople's ﾠRepublic, ﾠChina's ﾠanalog ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ
Privy ﾠCouncil ﾠin ﾠa ﾠWestminster ﾠsystem ﾠof ﾠgovernment. ﾠ  ﾠ
The ﾠpowers ﾠand ﾠresponsibilities ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠSASACs ﾠwere ﾠdefined ﾠin ﾠa ﾠMay ﾠ2003 ﾠ
State ﾠ Council ﾠ document ﾠ entitled ﾠ "Interim ﾠ Provisions ﾠ on ﾠ Supervision ﾠ and ﾠ
Administration ﾠof ﾠState-ﾭ‐owned ﾠAssets ﾠof ﾠEnterprises" ﾠ(Decree ﾠ378, ﾠ2003), ﾠand ﾠan ﾠ
amended ﾠ version ﾠ of ﾠ which ﾠ became ﾠ the ﾠ 2008 ﾠ Law ﾠ on ﾠ State-ﾭ‐owned ﾠ Assets ﾠ of ﾠ
Enterprises. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠassigned ﾠSASACs ﾠthe ﾠlegal ﾠliabilities ﾠand ﾠrights ﾠof ﾠinvestors ﾠholding ﾠ
SOE ﾠshares ﾠon ﾠbehalf ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠresponsibility ﾠof ﾠguiding ﾠand ﾠsupervising ﾠ
further ﾠSOE ﾠreforms. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
As ﾠ Figure ﾠ 3 ﾠ shows, ﾠ the ﾠ State ﾠ Council ﾠ SASAC ﾠ is ﾠ a ﾠ ministry ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ central ﾠ
government ﾠin ﾠBeijing, ﾠand ﾠserves ﾠas ﾠa ﾠholding ﾠcompany ﾠfor ﾠSOEs ﾠthat ﾠwere ﾠformerly ﾠ
part ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ central ﾠ government. ﾠ  ﾠ These ﾠ are ﾠ called ﾠ "central ﾠ SOEs" ﾠ (yang ﾠ qi), ﾠ
hereinafter ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs. ﾠ  ﾠ At ﾠits ﾠfounding ﾠin ﾠ2003, ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠSASAC ﾠhad ﾠcharge ﾠ
over ﾠ196 ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs. ﾠ  ﾠ Mergers ﾠover ﾠsubsequent ﾠyears ﾠreduced ﾠtheir ﾠnumber ﾠto ﾠ142 ﾠby ﾠ
the ﾠend ﾠof ﾠ2008, ﾠand ﾠ129 ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠend ﾠof ﾠ2009. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠSASAC ﾠis ﾠalso ﾠ ﾠ
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charged ﾠwith ﾠguiding ﾠand ﾠsupervising ﾠthe ﾠregional-ﾭ‐level ﾠSASACs, ﾠwhich ﾠcontrol ﾠother ﾠ
SOEs ﾠ that ﾠ were ﾠ formerly ﾠ parts ﾠ of ﾠ provincial, ﾠ city, ﾠ or ﾠ district ﾠ governments: ﾠ "local ﾠ
SOEs" ﾠ(di ﾠfang ﾠguo ﾠqi), ﾠhereinafter ﾠL-ﾭ‐SOEs. ﾠ
===Insert ﾠFigure ﾠ3 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
The ﾠSASAC ﾠreforms ﾠ"corporatized" ﾠSOEs ﾠinto ﾠentities ﾠrecognizable ﾠas ﾠjoint ﾠ
stock ﾠcompanies, ﾠwith ﾠshares ﾠbestowing ﾠownership ﾠrights ﾠand ﾠgovernance ﾠstructures ﾠ
regulated ﾠ by ﾠ Corporate ﾠ Law, ﾠ Securities ﾠ Law, ﾠ and ﾠ related ﾠ institutional ﾠ structures. ﾠ  ﾠ
These ﾠ so-ﾭ‐called ﾠ "modern ﾠ enterprise ﾠ system" ﾠ (xian ﾠ dai ﾠ qi ﾠ ye ﾠ zhi ﾠ du) ﾠ reforms ﾠ
fundamentally ﾠchanged ﾠSOEs ﾠin ﾠseveral ﾠways. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
First, ﾠ the ﾠ SOEs ﾠ became ﾠ legal ﾠ entities ﾠ with ﾠ owners. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠ necessitated ﾠthe ﾠ
clarification ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠproperty ﾠrights ﾠof ﾠboth ﾠthe ﾠSOEs ﾠand ﾠtheir ﾠshareholders. ﾠ  ﾠ State ﾠ
assets ﾠ formerly ﾠ used ﾠby ﾠ several ﾠ SOEs ﾠ had ﾠto ﾠ be ﾠ assigned ﾠ to ﾠ one ﾠ SOE ﾠor ﾠ divided ﾠ
cleanly ﾠamong ﾠmore ﾠthan ﾠone. ﾠ  ﾠ Because ﾠall ﾠshareholders ﾠin ﾠan ﾠSOE, ﾠincluding ﾠthe ﾠ
SASACs, ﾠwere ﾠthenceforth ﾠto ﾠhave ﾠidentical ﾠrights, ﾠthe ﾠfinal ﾠownership ﾠstructure ﾠʹ ﾠ
the ﾠfractions ﾠof ﾠshares ﾠin ﾠeach ﾠSOE ﾠowned ﾠby ﾠvarious ﾠministries, ﾠgovernment ﾠorgans, ﾠ
and ﾠ levels ﾠ of ﾠ government ﾠ had ﾠ to ﾠ be ﾠ clarified ﾠ so ﾠ these ﾠ could ﾠ be ﾠ assigned ﾠ to ﾠ the ﾠ
corresponding ﾠ SASACs. ﾠ  ﾠ Thereafter, ﾠ a ﾠ firm ﾠ in ﾠ China ﾠ is ﾠ officially ﾠ classified ﾠ as ﾠ
state-ﾭ‐owned ﾠor ﾠstate-ﾭ‐controlled ﾠonly ﾠif ﾠthe ﾠState, ﾠby ﾠdint ﾠof ﾠone ﾠand ﾠonly ﾠone ﾠSASAC ﾠ
or ﾠparent ﾠSOE, ﾠis ﾠits ﾠsole ﾠowner ﾠor ﾠmajority ﾠ(over ﾠ50% ﾠof ﾠshares) ﾠowner. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
Second, ﾠ the ﾠ reforms ﾠ gave ﾠ SOE ﾠ managers ﾠ meaningful ﾠ autonomy ﾠ over ﾠ
day-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐day ﾠbusiness ﾠdecisions. ﾠ  ﾠ Before ﾠthe ﾠSASAC ﾠreforms, ﾠall ﾠSOEs ﾠwere ﾠintegral ﾠ ﾠ
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parts ﾠof ﾠnational, ﾠprovincial, ﾠor ﾠlocal ﾠgovernments. ﾠ  ﾠ By ﾠrecasting ﾠSOEs ﾠinto ﾠdistinct ﾠ
entities, ﾠ the ﾠ reforms ﾠ severed ﾠ direct ﾠ bureaucratic ﾠ control ﾠ over ﾠ SOE ﾠ operations. ﾠ  ﾠ
Moreover, ﾠPremier ﾠWen ﾠJiabao ﾠpromised ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠfounding ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠSASAC ﾠ
that ﾠ the ﾠ SASACs ﾠ would ﾠ not ﾠ become ﾠ SOEs' ﾠ "mothers-ﾭ‐in-ﾭ‐law" ﾠ (po ﾠ po) ﾠ ʹ ﾠ a ﾠ term ﾠ
connoting ﾠoverbearing ﾠmeddling. ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
Nonetheless, ﾠthe ﾠSASACs ﾠequity ﾠblocks ﾠgave ﾠthem ﾠstrong ﾠcontrol ﾠrights ﾠover ﾠ
SOEs, ﾠwith ﾠwhich ﾠthey ﾠwere ﾠto ﾠfulfill ﾠtheir ﾠfourfold ﾠsupervision ﾠand ﾠadministration ﾠ
roles. ﾠ  ﾠ First, ﾠ the ﾠ SASACs ﾠ were ﾠ expected ﾠ to ﾠ affect ﾠ top ﾠ management ﾠ decisions ﾠ by ﾠ
using ﾠtheir ﾠequity ﾠblocks ﾠto ﾠcontrol ﾠSOE ﾠboards. ﾠ  ﾠ Second, ﾠthe ﾠSASACs, ﾠespecially ﾠthe ﾠ
State ﾠ Council ﾠ SASAC, ﾠ were ﾠ empowered ﾠ to ﾠ issue ﾠ regulations ﾠ and ﾠ documents ﾠ that ﾠ
SOEs ﾠhad ﾠto ﾠobey ﾠregarding ﾠdevelopment ﾠstrategies, ﾠinvestment ﾠdecisions, ﾠbudgets, ﾠ
audits, ﾠ risk ﾠ management ﾠ processes, ﾠ and ﾠ so ﾠ on.
11 ﾠ  ﾠ Third, ﾠ the ﾠ SASACs ﾠ were ﾠ
empowered ﾠ to ﾠ define, ﾠ and ﾠ redefine, ﾠ each ﾠ SOE's ﾠ primary ﾠ business ﾠ activity. ﾠ  ﾠ SOE ﾠ
executives ﾠthus ﾠneed ﾠprior ﾠSASAC ﾠapproval ﾠfor ﾠa ﾠshift ﾠin ﾠprimary ﾠfocus ﾠfrom ﾠone ﾠline ﾠ
of ﾠbusiness ﾠto ﾠanother, ﾠ though ﾠnot ﾠto ﾠacquire ﾠ control ﾠof ﾠa ﾠsubsidiary ﾠin ﾠanother ﾠ
sector. ﾠ  ﾠ Finally ﾠand ﾠmost ﾠimportantly, ﾠtop ﾠSOE ﾠexecutives ﾠwere ﾠthenceforth ﾠhired, ﾠ
renewed, ﾠand ﾠdismissed ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠSASACs, ﾠthough ﾠtop ﾠappointments ﾠin ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠalso ﾠ
required ﾠ approval ﾠ from ﾠ the ﾠ Organization ﾠ Department ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ Chinese ﾠ Communist ﾠ
Party ﾠ(CCP). ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠtop ﾠpositions ﾠthat ﾠalso ﾠrequire ﾠParty ﾠapproval ﾠinclude ﾠthe ﾠchair ﾠof ﾠ
the ﾠboard, ﾠchief ﾠexecutive ﾠofficer ﾠ(CEO), ﾠdeputy ﾠCEO, ﾠand ﾠany ﾠother ﾠkey ﾠposition ﾠthe ﾠ
CCP ﾠ Organization ﾠ Department ﾠ considers ﾠ important. ﾠ  ﾠ Most ﾠ recently, ﾠ the ﾠ "Interim ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
11 ﾠ ϮϬϬϴ^ƚĂƚĞŽƵŶĐŝů^^ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ͞ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨ^^ƐŝŶƚŚĞWĂƐƚ&ŝǀĞzĞĂƌƐ͟
reports ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠSASAC ﾠissued ﾠ19 ﾠregulations ﾠand ﾠ104 ﾠdocuments ﾠfrom ﾠ2003 ﾠto ﾠ2008, ﾠ
while ﾠlocal ﾠSASACs ﾠissued ﾠover ﾠ1,600 ﾠdocuments ﾠduring ﾠthat ﾠperiod. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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 ﾠ
Provisions ﾠon ﾠManagement ﾠof ﾠExecutives ﾠin ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs", ﾠissued ﾠjointly ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠCentral ﾠ
Committee ﾠof ﾠCCP ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠin ﾠDecember, ﾠ2009, ﾠenshrines ﾠthe ﾠprinciple ﾠ
of ﾠ"absolute ﾠcontrol ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠexecutives ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠParty" ﾠ(dang ﾠguan ﾠgan ﾠbu). ﾠ  ﾠ Consistent ﾠ
with ﾠits ﾠincontestable ﾠcontrol ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠeconomy's ﾠ"commanding ﾠheights," ﾠthe ﾠParty ﾠ
thus ﾠ retains ﾠ direct ﾠ control ﾠ over ﾠ SOEs ﾠ by ﾠ dint ﾠ of ﾠ directly ﾠ controlling ﾠ their ﾠ top ﾠ
executives' ﾠcareers. ﾠ
This ﾠleads ﾠdirectly ﾠinto ﾠthe ﾠthird ﾠimportant ﾠfeature ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠnew ﾠsystem: ﾠSASACs ﾠ
control ﾠover ﾠSOE ﾠtop ﾠexecutives' ﾠincentives. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠassigns ﾠSASACs ﾠthe ﾠ
responsibility ﾠ to ﾠ "evaluate ﾠ the ﾠ executives ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ enterprises ﾠ through ﾠ legal ﾠ
procedures, ﾠand ﾠgrant ﾠrewards ﾠor ﾠpunishments ﾠaccording ﾠto ﾠtheir ﾠperformance."
12 ﾠ  ﾠ
The ﾠ SASACs ﾠ consider ﾠ this ﾠ one ﾠ of ﾠ their ﾠ major ﾠ instruments ﾠ for ﾠ "improving" ﾠ SOE ﾠ
performance. ﾠ  ﾠ One ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠDocuments ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠSASAC ﾠissued ﾠafter ﾠits ﾠ
2003 ﾠ founding ﾠ was ﾠ the ﾠ "Interim ﾠ Provisions ﾠ on ﾠ Performance ﾠ Evaluations ﾠ for ﾠ
Executives ﾠof ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs." ﾠ ﾠRevised ﾠtwice, ﾠin ﾠ2006 ﾠand ﾠagain ﾠin ﾠ2009, ﾠthis ﾠDocument ﾠ
mandates ﾠ that ﾠ State ﾠ Council ﾠ SASAC ﾠ conducts ﾠ annual ﾠ and ﾠ triennial ﾠ evaluations ﾠ of ﾠ
C-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠtop ﾠexecutives ﾠfor ﾠuse ﾠin ﾠdetermining ﾠthe ﾠexecutives' ﾠcompensations. ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
The ﾠ Document ﾠ divides ﾠ an ﾠ executive's ﾠ compensation ﾠ into ﾠ a ﾠ "base ﾠ salary", ﾠ
typically ﾠabout ﾠone ﾠthird ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠtotal, ﾠand ﾠa ﾠ"bonus", ﾠthe ﾠremaining ﾠroughly ﾠtwo ﾠ
thirds. ﾠ  ﾠ Following ﾠthe ﾠ2006 ﾠamendments, ﾠlisted ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠcould ﾠalso ﾠgrant ﾠtheir ﾠtop ﾠ
executives ﾠshares ﾠas ﾠa ﾠthird ﾠcomponent ﾠof ﾠcompensation, ﾠthough ﾠfew ﾠdo ﾠso ﾠas ﾠyet. ﾠ  ﾠ
The ﾠ State ﾠ Council ﾠ SASAC ﾠ reports ﾠ the ﾠ average ﾠ annual ﾠ salary, ﾠ including ﾠ both ﾠ base ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
12 ﾠ Source: ﾠ "Interim ﾠ Provisions ﾠ on ﾠ Supervision ﾠ and ﾠ Administration ﾠ of ﾠ State-ﾭ‐owned ﾠ Assets ﾠ of ﾠ
ŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐΗ;^ƚĂƚĞŽƵŶĐŝů͛ƐĞĐƌĞĞϯϳϴ͕ϮϬϬϯͿ͘  ﾠ ﾠ
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salary ﾠand ﾠbonus, ﾠof ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠCEOs ﾠrising ﾠfrom ﾠRMB ﾠ350,000 ﾠin ﾠ2004 ﾠto ﾠabout ﾠRMB ﾠ
600,000 ﾠin ﾠ2009, ﾠa ﾠlevel ﾠconsiderably ﾠabove ﾠthat ﾠof ﾠtop ﾠministry-ﾭ‐level ﾠcivil ﾠservants ﾠin ﾠ
the ﾠcentral ﾠgovernment.
13 ﾠ  ﾠ
In ﾠ theory, ﾠ this ﾠ directly ﾠ links ﾠ the ﾠ income ﾠ of ﾠ an ﾠ SOE's ﾠ top ﾠ executives ﾠ to ﾠ its ﾠ
performance. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠSASAC ﾠassigns ﾠthe ﾠexecutive ﾠa ﾠgrade, ﾠwith ﾠA ﾠthe ﾠhighest ﾠand ﾠE ﾠ
the ﾠlowest, ﾠin ﾠhis ﾠSASAC ﾠannual ﾠevaluation. ﾠ  ﾠ An ﾠA ﾠmeans ﾠa ﾠtriple ﾠbonus, ﾠwhile ﾠan ﾠE ﾠ
means ﾠno ﾠbonus ﾠat ﾠall. ﾠ  ﾠ Sixty ﾠpercent ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠbonus ﾠis ﾠpaid ﾠimmediately ﾠafter ﾠthe ﾠ
annual ﾠ evaluation, ﾠ while ﾠ the ﾠ remainder ﾠ is ﾠ held ﾠ in ﾠ abeyance ﾠ until ﾠ the ﾠ end ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ
executive's ﾠterm ﾠof ﾠoffice, ﾠtypically ﾠthree-ﾭ‐years, ﾠand ﾠdisbursed ﾠcompletely ﾠonly ﾠif ﾠthe ﾠ
executive ﾠgets ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠa ﾠC ﾠgrade ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠtriennial ﾠevaluation.
14 ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠboth ﾠevaluations, ﾠ
the ﾠSASAC ﾠis ﾠto ﾠgauge ﾠthe ﾠperformance ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠSOE ﾠunder ﾠthe ﾠexecutive's ﾠstewardship ﾠ
in ﾠ terms ﾠ of ﾠ absolute ﾠ profits, ﾠ economic ﾠ value ﾠ added ﾠ (EVA), ﾠ appreciation ﾠ in ﾠ asset ﾠ
valuations, ﾠ and ﾠ annualized ﾠ revenue ﾠ growth ﾠ rates ﾠ in ﾠ the ﾠ SOE's ﾠ primary ﾠ line ﾠ of ﾠ
business. ﾠ  ﾠ
The ﾠgrades ﾠan ﾠSOE ﾠexecutive ﾠattains ﾠalso ﾠaffect ﾠhis ﾠsubsequent ﾠcareer ﾠpath. ﾠ  ﾠ
But, ﾠas ﾠnoted ﾠabove, ﾠthe ﾠSASAC ﾠmakes ﾠrecommendations ﾠregarding ﾠSOE ﾠexecutives' ﾠ
promotions ﾠat ﾠtheir ﾠtriennial ﾠevaluations. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠOrganization ﾠDepartment ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠCCP ﾠ
then ﾠpromotes, ﾠdemotes, ﾠor ﾠlaterally ﾠtransfers ﾠthe ﾠexecutive ﾠto ﾠhis ﾠnext ﾠposition, ﾠ
which ﾠis ﾠseldom ﾠwith ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠSOE ﾠ(McGregor ﾠ2010). ﾠ  ﾠ Rather, ﾠSOE ﾠexecutives' ﾠnext ﾠ
positions ﾠare ﾠtypically ﾠat ﾠother ﾠSOEs ﾠor ﾠin ﾠgovernment ﾠbureaucracies ﾠor ﾠParty ﾠorgans. ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
13 ﾠ Source: ﾠspeech ﾠby ﾠMr ﾠLi ﾠRongrong, ﾠdirector ﾠof ﾠ  ﾠ State ﾠCouncil ﾠSASAC ﾠin ﾠJan ﾠ9, ﾠ2010. ﾠ  ﾠ
14 ﾠ See ﾠthe ﾠlatest ﾠversion ﾠof ﾠ"Interim ﾠProvisions ﾠon ﾠPerformance ﾠEvaluations ﾠfor ﾠExecutives ﾠof ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs" ﾠ
(State ﾠCouncil ﾠSASAC ﾠDocument ﾠ22, ﾠ2009) ﾠfor ﾠmore ﾠdetails. ﾠ ﾠ
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The ﾠ Organization ﾠ Department ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ CCP ﾠ ranks ﾠ all ﾠ government, ﾠ Party, ﾠ and ﾠ SOE ﾠ
positions ﾠso ﾠthat ﾠpromotions, ﾠdemotions, ﾠand ﾠlateral ﾠtransfers ﾠcan ﾠbe ﾠclearly ﾠdefined. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
This ﾠ subjects ﾠ top ﾠ executives ﾠ to ﾠ a ﾠ loyalty ﾠ test: ﾠ career ﾠ success ﾠ depends ﾠ on ﾠ
adherence ﾠto ﾠCCP ﾠpolicies ﾠand ﾠharmonious ﾠcooperation ﾠadvancing ﾠCCP ﾠpriorities, ﾠor ﾠ
perhaps ﾠmore ﾠaccurately, ﾠobedience ﾠto ﾠsenior ﾠgovernment ﾠand ﾠParty ﾠofficials' ﾠorders. ﾠ  ﾠ
A ﾠtop ﾠSOE ﾠexecutive ﾠjudged ﾠunresponsive ﾠto ﾠsuch ﾠdirection ﾠrisks ﾠnot ﾠbeing ﾠpromoted, ﾠ
or ﾠeven ﾠbeing ﾠdemoted ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠend ﾠof ﾠhis ﾠthree-ﾭ‐year ﾠterm ﾠends ﾠʹ ﾠeven ﾠif ﾠhis ﾠSOEs ﾠ
performs ﾠwell. ﾠ  ﾠ Kato ﾠand ﾠLang ﾠ(2004), ﾠBai ﾠand ﾠXu ﾠ(2005), ﾠFirth, ﾠFung ﾠand ﾠRui ﾠ(2006), ﾠ
Zhao, ﾠ Yang ﾠ and ﾠ Bai ﾠ (2007) ﾠ find ﾠ top ﾠ executive ﾠ turnovers ﾠ in ﾠ listed ﾠ Chinese ﾠ SOEs ﾠ
significantly ﾠless ﾠrelated ﾠto ﾠROA, ﾠROS ﾠand ﾠother ﾠperformance ﾠindicators ﾠthan ﾠin ﾠother ﾠ
listed ﾠfirms. ﾠ
The ﾠ SASAC ﾠ reforms ﾠ are ﾠ problematic ﾠ for ﾠ two ﾠ reasons. ﾠ  ﾠ First, ﾠ the ﾠ reforms ﾠ
seemingly ﾠ give ﾠ SOE ﾠ top ﾠ executives ﾠ greater ﾠ autonomy ﾠ by ﾠ excising ﾠ them ﾠ from ﾠ the ﾠ
bureaucratic ﾠchain ﾠof ﾠcommand ﾠwithin ﾠa ﾠministry. ﾠ  ﾠ However, ﾠSOE ﾠexecutives' ﾠcareer ﾠ
prospects ﾠ still ﾠ depend ﾠ on ﾠ decisions ﾠ by ﾠ the ﾠ Organization ﾠ Department ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ CCP, ﾠ
which ﾠis ﾠcharged ﾠwith ﾠensuring ﾠloyalty ﾠto ﾠParty ﾠand ﾠgovernment ﾠpolicies. ﾠ  ﾠ Second, ﾠ
the ﾠreforms ﾠexplicitly ﾠlink ﾠSOE ﾠexecutive ﾠbonuses ﾠto ﾠquantitatively ﾠmeasurable ﾠSOE ﾠ
financial ﾠperformance ﾠindicators: ﾠprofits, ﾠEVA, ﾠasset ﾠvalue ﾠappreciation, ﾠand ﾠrevenue ﾠ
growth. ﾠ(These ﾠare ﾠsupplemented ﾠby ﾠshare ﾠvalues ﾠin ﾠonly ﾠa ﾠhandful ﾠof ﾠlisted ﾠSOEs.) ﾠ  ﾠ
However, ﾠall ﾠfour ﾠprimary ﾠfinancial ﾠindicators ﾠmeasure ﾠshort-ﾭ‐term ﾠperformance, ﾠand ﾠ
SOE ﾠexecutives' ﾠbonuses ﾠand ﾠpromotions ﾠdepend ﾠon ﾠthree ﾠannual ﾠevaluations ﾠand ﾠ
one ﾠtriennial ﾠevaluation ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠrelevant ﾠSASAC. ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠalmost ﾠall ﾠcases, ﾠthree ﾠyears ﾠof ﾠ ﾠ
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good ﾠperformance ﾠlocks ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠexecutive's ﾠbonuses ﾠand ﾠjustifies ﾠa ﾠpromotion ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠ
CCP ﾠOrganization ﾠDepartment ﾠto ﾠa ﾠhigher ﾠposition ﾠin ﾠa ﾠgovernment ﾠbureaucracy ﾠor ﾠa ﾠ
different ﾠSOE. ﾠ  ﾠ Policies ﾠthat ﾠartificially ﾠinflated ﾠshort-ﾭ‐term ﾠperformance ﾠand ﾠcreate ﾠ
future ﾠproblems ﾠare ﾠsomeone ﾠelse's ﾠproblem. ﾠ  ﾠ
In ﾠ summary, ﾠ the ﾠ reforms ﾠ sever ﾠ SOE ﾠ executives ﾠ from ﾠ the ﾠ ministries ﾠ that ﾠ
formerly ﾠcontained ﾠthem, ﾠbut ﾠpreserve ﾠthe ﾠParty's ﾠincontestable ﾠcontrol ﾠover ﾠSOE ﾠ
executives' ﾠ careers. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ reforms ﾠ tie ﾠ SOE ﾠ executive ﾠ bonuses ﾠ to ﾠ SOE ﾠ financial ﾠ
performance ﾠ measures, ﾠ but ﾠ only ﾠ to ﾠ measures ﾠ of ﾠ short-ﾭ‐term ﾠ performance. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ
overall ﾠeffect ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠreforms ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠefficiency ﾠof ﾠresource ﾠallocation ﾠis ﾠthus ﾠquite ﾠ
ambiguous. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
The ﾠoverall ﾠeffect ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠSASAC ﾠreforms ﾠis ﾠthus ﾠa ﾠpriori ﾠunclear. ﾠ  ﾠ SOE ﾠtop ﾠ
executives ﾠhave ﾠgreater ﾠautonomy ﾠthan ﾠbefore, ﾠbut ﾠ are ﾠalso ﾠlikely ﾠunder ﾠgreater ﾠ
pressure. ﾠ  ﾠ On ﾠ the ﾠ one ﾠ hand, ﾠ this ﾠ pressure ﾠ encourages ﾠ better ﾠ SOE ﾠ performance ﾠ
because ﾠtop ﾠexecutive ﾠcompensation ﾠis ﾠmore ﾠexplicitly ﾠtied ﾠto ﾠSOE ﾠperformance ﾠand, ﾠ
in ﾠthe ﾠcase ﾠof ﾠa ﾠfew ﾠlisted ﾠSOEs, ﾠshare ﾠprices. ﾠ  ﾠ On ﾠthe ﾠother ﾠhand, ﾠthis ﾠpressure ﾠ
subjects ﾠ SOE ﾠ top ﾠ executives ﾠ to ﾠ more ﾠ political ﾠ interference ﾠ because ﾠ their ﾠ career ﾠ
prospects ﾠdepend ﾠon ﾠtheir ﾠloyalty ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠParty ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠgovernment. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
These ﾠdual ﾠcriteria ﾠfor ﾠevaluating ﾠSOE ﾠtop ﾠexecutives ﾠʹ ﾠdeliver ﾠprofits ﾠand ﾠ
serve ﾠthe ﾠgovernment ﾠʹ ﾠcan ﾠalign ﾠif, ﾠas ﾠDeng ﾠXiaoping ﾠproclaimed, ﾠ"to ﾠbe ﾠrich ﾠis ﾠ
glorious" ﾠ(zhi ﾠfu ﾠguang ﾠrong). ﾠ  ﾠ But ﾠif ﾠgovernment ﾠpriorities ﾠshift ﾠaway ﾠfrom ﾠthis, ﾠSOE ﾠ
performance ﾠand ﾠloyalty ﾠmay ﾠconflict; ﾠand ﾠSOE ﾠtop ﾠexecutives ﾠmust ﾠbalance ﾠdual ﾠ
objectives: ﾠ augmenting ﾠ corporate ﾠ performance ﾠ for ﾠ the ﾠ sake ﾠ of ﾠ their ﾠ near-ﾭ‐term ﾠ ﾠ
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compensation, ﾠ but ﾠ obeying ﾠ government ﾠ directives ﾠ to ﾠ protect ﾠ their ﾠ longer ﾠ term ﾠ
careers. ﾠ  ﾠ
The ﾠ balance ﾠ in ﾠ such ﾠ cases ﾠ is ﾠ almost ﾠ certainly ﾠ strongly ﾠ tilted ﾠ towards ﾠ
obedience ﾠto ﾠgovernment ﾠdirectives, ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠOrganization ﾠDepartment ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ CCP ﾠ
remains ﾠoverwhelmingly ﾠimportant ﾠto ﾠadvancing ﾠor ﾠblocking ﾠSOE ﾠexecutives' ﾠcareers ﾠ
at ﾠall ﾠlevels. ﾠ  ﾠ Risking ﾠthe ﾠOrganization ﾠDepartment's ﾠdispleasure ﾠby ﾠdefying ﾠpolitical ﾠ
directives ﾠ to ﾠ protect ﾠ an ﾠ SOE's ﾠ financial ﾠ bottom ﾠ line ﾠ would ﾠ likely ﾠ appeal ﾠ to ﾠ few ﾠ
ambitious ﾠmanagers. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
We ﾠ believe ﾠ that ﾠ China's ﾠ recent ﾠ stimulus ﾠ package ﾠ took ﾠ effect ﾠ within ﾠ this ﾠ
context. ﾠTop ﾠexecutives ﾠof ﾠSOE ﾠbanks ﾠand ﾠnonfinancial ﾠSOEs ﾠobeyed ﾠ government ﾠ
orders ﾠto ﾠlend ﾠand ﾠto ﾠinvest, ﾠrespectively, ﾠbut ﾠdid ﾠso ﾠin ﾠways ﾠthat ﾠminimized ﾠdamage ﾠ
to ﾠtheir ﾠSOEs' ﾠnear-ﾭ‐term ﾠprofitability. ﾠ  ﾠ Specifically, ﾠSOE ﾠbank ﾠexecutives ﾠlent, ﾠnot ﾠto ﾠ
private ﾠentrepreneurs, ﾠbut ﾠto ﾠnonfinancial ﾠSOEs ﾠbecause ﾠthe ﾠlatter ﾠwere ﾠunlikely ﾠto ﾠ
fail ﾠin ﾠa ﾠmacroeconomic ﾠdownturn. ﾠ  ﾠ SOEs ﾠinvested ﾠnot ﾠin ﾠproductivity-ﾭ‐enhancing ﾠ
corporate ﾠassets, ﾠbut ﾠin ﾠreal ﾠestate. ﾠ  ﾠ We ﾠposit ﾠthat ﾠthis ﾠresponse ﾠexplains ﾠthe ﾠspeed ﾠ
and ﾠ scale ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ stimulus ﾠ package's ﾠ impact. ﾠ  ﾠ To ﾠ the ﾠ extent ﾠ that ﾠ the ﾠ stimulus ﾠ
successfully ﾠ corrected ﾠ a ﾠ market ﾠ failure, ﾠ this ﾠ may ﾠ well ﾠ benefit ﾠ macroeconomic ﾠ
performance. ﾠ  ﾠ But ﾠif ﾠSOE ﾠexecutives' ﾠresponses ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠstimulus ﾠmisallocated ﾠthe ﾠ




2.2 ﾠ  ﾠ Current ﾠStatus ﾠof ﾠSOEs ﾠ
To ﾠplay ﾠa ﾠmajor ﾠrole ﾠin ﾠeffecting ﾠthe ﾠcentral ﾠgovernment's ﾠmacroeconomic ﾠstimulus, ﾠ
SOEs ﾠ must ﾠ be ﾠ an ﾠ economically ﾠ significant ﾠ part ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ economy. ﾠ  ﾠ Despite ﾠ the ﾠ
ongoing ﾠreorganization ﾠand ﾠprivatization ﾠof ﾠsmall-ﾭ‐ ﾠand ﾠmedium-ﾭ‐sized ﾠSOEs, ﾠwhich ﾠ
has ﾠcaused ﾠa ﾠsteady ﾠdecline ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠnumber ﾠof ﾠSOEs ﾠover ﾠthe ﾠpast ﾠdecade, ﾠSOEs ﾠretain ﾠ
the ﾠcommanding ﾠheights ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠChinese ﾠeconomy. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
The ﾠpast ﾠthree ﾠcensuses ﾠby ﾠNational ﾠBureau ﾠof ﾠStatistics ﾠin ﾠChina ﾠ(Table ﾠ1) ﾠshow ﾠ
the ﾠnumber ﾠof ﾠSOEs, ﾠfinancial ﾠand ﾠnonfinancial, ﾠfalling ﾠfrom ﾠ369,000 ﾠ(12.19% ﾠof ﾠall ﾠ
enterprises) ﾠin ﾠ2001 ﾠto ﾠ192,000 ﾠ(5.91%) ﾠin ﾠ2004, ﾠand ﾠthen ﾠ156,000 ﾠ(3.15%) ﾠin ﾠ2008. ﾠ  ﾠ
Over ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠtime ﾠspan, ﾠthe ﾠnumber ﾠof ﾠprivate ﾠenterprises ﾠnearly ﾠtripled, ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠ
number ﾠof ﾠjoint-ﾭ‐stock ﾠenterprises ﾠnot ﾠexplicitly ﾠcontrolled ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠrose ﾠby ﾠover ﾠ
110%. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠSASAC's ﾠstatistics ﾠalso ﾠshow ﾠthe ﾠnumber ﾠof ﾠnon-ﾭ‐financial ﾠ
SOEs ﾠcontrolled ﾠby ﾠprovincial-ﾭ‐level ﾠor ﾠhigher ﾠSASACs ﾠfalling ﾠfrom ﾠ150,000 ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠend ﾠ
of ﾠ2003 ﾠto ﾠ115,115 ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠend ﾠof ﾠ2009. ﾠ
===Insert ﾠTable ﾠ1 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
However, ﾠnumbers ﾠalone ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠgauge ﾠimportance. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠParty's ﾠpolicy ﾠof ﾠ
"grasping ﾠthe ﾠbig, ﾠletting ﾠgo ﾠthe ﾠsmall" ﾠ(zhua ﾠda ﾠfang ﾠxiao) ﾠSOEs ﾠmeans ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠ
remaining ﾠstable ﾠof ﾠSOEs ﾠis ﾠsuccessively ﾠnarrowed ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠvery ﾠlargest. ﾠ  ﾠ These ﾠmainly ﾠ
include ﾠ monopolies ﾠ in ﾠ the ﾠ natural ﾠ resources ﾠ and ﾠ infrastructure ﾠ sectors ﾠ (such ﾠ as ﾠ
mining, ﾠelectricity, ﾠtelecom, ﾠand ﾠfuels), ﾠand ﾠa ﾠfew ﾠleading ﾠcompanies ﾠin ﾠsome ﾠother ﾠ ﾠ
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important ﾠindustries ﾠ(such ﾠas ﾠreal ﾠestate, ﾠconstruction, ﾠ and ﾠcar ﾠmanufacturing).
15 ﾠ ﾠ
The ﾠ2008 ﾠEconomic ﾠCensus ﾠthus ﾠclassifies ﾠonly ﾠ3.15% ﾠof ﾠall ﾠenterprises ﾠas ﾠSOEs, ﾠbut ﾠ
these ﾠ contained ﾠ 30.53% ﾠ of ﾠ total ﾠ enterprise ﾠ assets ﾠ (Table ﾠ 2). ﾠ  ﾠ Listed ﾠ SOEs ﾠ also ﾠ
constituted ﾠ27.85% ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠtotal ﾠmarket ﾠcapitalization ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠShanghai ﾠand ﾠShenzhen ﾠ
stock ﾠmarkets ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠend ﾠof ﾠ2009. ﾠ  ﾠ Thus, ﾠChina's ﾠremaining ﾠSOEs ﾠare ﾠextraordinarily ﾠ
large, ﾠand ﾠquite ﾠplausibly ﾠcontinue ﾠto ﾠplay ﾠcentral ﾠroles ﾠin ﾠtheir ﾠindustries ﾠand ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠ
national ﾠeconomy. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
===Insert ﾠTable ﾠ2 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
Moreover, ﾠthese ﾠfigures ﾠalmost ﾠcertainly ﾠgreatly ﾠunderstate ﾠthe ﾠtrue ﾠscope ﾠof ﾠ
state ﾠ control ﾠ over ﾠ nominally ﾠ private ﾠ sector ﾠ and ﾠ listed ﾠ firms ﾠ because ﾠ many ﾠ SOEs ﾠ
control ﾠ business ﾠ groups. ﾠ  ﾠ These ﾠ structures ﾠ resemble ﾠ large ﾠ family ﾠ controlled ﾠ
pyramidal ﾠgroups, ﾠin ﾠwhich ﾠan ﾠapex ﾠfamily ﾠfirm ﾠcontrols ﾠa ﾠfirst ﾠtier ﾠof ﾠlisted ﾠfirms, ﾠ
each ﾠof ﾠwhich ﾠcontrols ﾠother ﾠlisted ﾠfirms, ﾠeach ﾠof ﾠwhich ﾠcontrols ﾠyet ﾠmore ﾠlisted ﾠ
firms, ﾠand ﾠso ﾠon ﾠ(La ﾠPorta ﾠet ﾠal. ﾠ1999; ﾠMorck, ﾠStangeland, ﾠYeung ﾠ2000). ﾠ  ﾠ However, ﾠ
the ﾠstructures ﾠbeing ﾠorganized ﾠin ﾠChina ﾠfeature ﾠan ﾠSOE, ﾠrather ﾠthan ﾠa ﾠfamily ﾠfirm, ﾠat ﾠ
the ﾠapex. ﾠ  ﾠ A ﾠfirm ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠlower ﾠtiers ﾠmay ﾠseem ﾠto ﾠlack ﾠany ﾠcontrolling ﾠshareholder ﾠ
(and ﾠthus ﾠnot ﾠexplicated ﾠlabeled ﾠas ﾠSOE), ﾠbut ﾠthe ﾠcombined ﾠstakes ﾠof ﾠseveral ﾠSOEs ﾠor ﾠ
SOE ﾠcontrolled ﾠfirms ﾠmay ﾠaggregate ﾠto ﾠa ﾠcontrol ﾠblock. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
The ﾠ142 ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠstill ﾠextant ﾠin ﾠ2008 ﾠcontrolled ﾠ19,250 ﾠother ﾠenterprises. ﾠ  ﾠ Of ﾠ
these, ﾠ8,524 ﾠare ﾠwholly ﾠstate-ﾭ‐owned; ﾠanother ﾠ9,534 ﾠare ﾠlisted ﾠas ﾠstate-ﾭ‐controlled; ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ




and ﾠ the ﾠ remaining ﾠ 1,192 ﾠ are ﾠ explicitly ﾠ grouped ﾠ as ﾠ non-ﾭ‐SOEs. ﾠ  ﾠ Of ﾠ the ﾠ 19,250 ﾠ
enterprises, ﾠ State ﾠ Council ﾠ SASAC͛Ɛ ﾠ statistics ﾠ count ﾠ 235 ﾠ as ﾠ listed ﾠ in ﾠ mainland ﾠ
exchanges ﾠand ﾠ71 ﾠas ﾠlisted ﾠin ﾠHong ﾠKong. ﾠ  ﾠ By ﾠthe ﾠend ﾠof ﾠ2009, ﾠthe ﾠnumber ﾠof ﾠlisted ﾠ
C-ﾭ‐SOE-ﾭ‐controlled ﾠ firms ﾠ in ﾠ the ﾠ mainland ﾠ and ﾠ Hong ﾠ Kong ﾠ rose ﾠ to ﾠ 260 ﾠ and ﾠ 88, ﾠ
respectively.
16 ﾠ According ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠSASAC's ﾠstatistics, ﾠnonfinancial ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠ
accounted ﾠfor ﾠabout ﾠ40% ﾠof ﾠtotal ﾠnonfinancial ﾠSOE ﾠassets, ﾠover ﾠ60% ﾠof ﾠtheir ﾠsales, ﾠ
and ﾠover ﾠ70% ﾠof ﾠtheir ﾠprofits ﾠin ﾠ2009. ﾠ
In ﾠsummary, ﾠdespite ﾠtheir ﾠsmall ﾠand ﾠdecreasing ﾠnumbers, ﾠ SOEs, ﾠespecially ﾠ
large ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs, ﾠremain ﾠvery ﾠsignificant ﾠeconomically. ﾠ  ﾠ That ﾠthey ﾠcould ﾠplay ﾠa ﾠcentral ﾠ
role ﾠin ﾠeffecting ﾠChina's ﾠmacroeconomic ﾠstimulus ﾠpackage ﾠis ﾠquite ﾠplausible. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ
2.3 ﾠ  ﾠ SOE ﾠBanks ﾠ
State-ﾭ‐owned ﾠbanks ﾠdominated ﾠChina's ﾠfinancial ﾠsector ﾠsince ﾠ1949 ﾠ(Allen, ﾠQian ﾠand ﾠ
Qian, ﾠ 2005, ﾠ 2008), ﾠ and ﾠ recent ﾠ reforms ﾠ have ﾠ not ﾠ altered ﾠ this. ﾠ  ﾠ Banking ﾠ sector ﾠ
reforms ﾠclosely ﾠparallel ﾠthose ﾠdescribed ﾠabove ﾠin ﾠconnection ﾠwith ﾠnon-ﾭ‐financial ﾠSOEs. ﾠ  ﾠ
In ﾠ2003, ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠSASACs ﾠwere ﾠfounded, ﾠthe ﾠChina ﾠBanking ﾠRegulatory ﾠCommission ﾠ
(CBRC) ﾠwas ﾠalso ﾠfounded ﾠto ﾠdirect ﾠand ﾠsupervise ﾠthe ﾠoperation ﾠof ﾠall ﾠbanks. ﾠ  ﾠ Unlike ﾠ
the ﾠSASACs, ﾠthe ﾠCBRC ﾠdoes ﾠnot ﾠhold ﾠshares ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠSOEs ﾠit ﾠdirects. ﾠ  ﾠ Rather, ﾠthe ﾠmajor ﾠ
shareholders ﾠin ﾠSOE ﾠbanks ﾠare ﾠthe ﾠMinistry ﾠof ﾠFinance ﾠand ﾠa ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE, ﾠthe ﾠCentral ﾠHuijin ﾠ
Investment ﾠLtd. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
16 ﾠ Source: ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠSASAC, ﾠ͞2009 ﾠAnnual ﾠReport,͟ ﾠAug ﾠ3, ﾠ2010. ﾠ ﾠ
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The ﾠCentral ﾠHuijin ﾠInvestment ﾠLtd ﾠwas ﾠestablished ﾠin ﾠ2003 ﾠas ﾠa ﾠbranch ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ
State ﾠAssociation ﾠfor ﾠForeign ﾠExchange ﾠ(SAFE), ﾠan ﾠadministrative ﾠagency ﾠsubordinate ﾠ
to ﾠ the ﾠ People's ﾠ Bank ﾠ of ﾠ China. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ State ﾠ Council ﾠ authorized ﾠ Central ﾠ Huijin ﾠ
Investment ﾠ Ltd ﾠ to ﾠ buy ﾠ equity ﾠ in ﾠ financial ﾠ SOEs, ﾠ thereby ﾠ injecting ﾠ capital ﾠ to ﾠ
compensate ﾠ for ﾠ their ﾠ accumulated ﾠ nonperforming ﾠ loans ﾠ problems. ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠ 2007, ﾠ
Central ﾠHuijin ﾠInvestment ﾠLtd ﾠwas ﾠcorporatized ﾠas ﾠa ﾠsubsidiary ﾠof ﾠCIC, ﾠChina's ﾠnewly ﾠ
formed ﾠsovereign ﾠwealth ﾠfund ﾠ(Pistor ﾠ2010). ﾠ  ﾠ
A ﾠfully ﾠowned ﾠsubsidiary, ﾠCentral ﾠHuijin ﾠconstituted ﾠroughly ﾠone ﾠthird ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ
CIC's ﾠtotal ﾠassets ﾠin ﾠ2007. ﾠ  ﾠ However, ﾠthe ﾠCIC ﾠhas ﾠno ﾠgovernance ﾠpowers: ﾠCentral ﾠ
Huijin's ﾠcorporate ﾠcharter ﾠspecifies ﾠthat ﾠits ﾠmanagement ﾠand ﾠsupervisory ﾠboards ﾠare ﾠ
to ﾠbe ﾠappointed ﾠdirectly ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠ(Pistor ﾠ2010). ﾠ  ﾠ Ownership ﾠand ﾠcontrol ﾠ
thus ﾠappear ﾠfully ﾠseparated. ﾠ  ﾠ However, ﾠin ﾠpractice, ﾠthe ﾠOrganization ﾠDepartment ﾠof ﾠ
the ﾠCCP ﾠactually ﾠappoints ﾠthe ﾠtop ﾠexecutives ﾠof ﾠCentral ﾠHuijin ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠCIC, ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠ
CIC's ﾠ portfolio ﾠ is ﾠ de ﾠ facto ﾠ an ﾠ investments ﾠ arm ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ CCP; ﾠ perhaps ﾠ reuniting ﾠ
ownership ﾠ and ﾠ control ﾠat ﾠ a ﾠ more ﾠ basic ﾠ level ﾠ (Huang ﾠ 1996; ﾠ Shih ﾠ 2008; ﾠ McGregor ﾠ
2010). ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
Within ﾠthis ﾠinstitutional ﾠframework, ﾠthe ﾠCBRC ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠMinistry ﾠof ﾠFinance ﾠ
issue ﾠdocuments, ﾠlike ﾠthose ﾠissued ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠSASACs, ﾠdirecting ﾠSOE ﾠbanks' ﾠgovernance. ﾠ  ﾠ
For ﾠexample, ﾠthe ﾠ"Interim ﾠProvisions ﾠon ﾠPerformance ﾠEvaluation ﾠof ﾠState-ﾭ‐owned ﾠand ﾠ
State-ﾭ‐Controlled ﾠFinancial ﾠEnterprises", ﾠissued ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠMinistry ﾠof ﾠFinance ﾠin ﾠ2009, ﾠ
mandates ﾠthe ﾠperiodic ﾠevaluation ﾠof ﾠeach ﾠSOE ﾠbank's ﾠprofitability, ﾠasset ﾠappreciation, ﾠ
asset ﾠquality ﾠand ﾠsolvency ﾠfor ﾠpurposes ﾠof ﾠdetermining ﾠthe ﾠsalary, ﾠreappointment ﾠ ﾠ
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and ﾠpromotion ﾠof ﾠeach ﾠtop ﾠexecutive. ﾠ  ﾠ Also ﾠas ﾠwith ﾠnonfinancial ﾠSOEs, ﾠSOE ﾠbanks' ﾠ
core ﾠ executives ﾠ are ﾠ appointed, ﾠ removed ﾠ and ﾠ re-ﾭ‐assigned ﾠ by ﾠ the ﾠ Organization ﾠ
Department ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠCCP. ﾠ  ﾠ Top ﾠexecutives ﾠat ﾠSOE ﾠbanks ﾠthus ﾠconfront ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠdual ﾠ
goals ﾠof ﾠgood ﾠfirm ﾠperformance ﾠand ﾠloyalty ﾠto ﾠgovernment ﾠdictates ﾠthat ﾠother ﾠSOEs ﾠ
contend ﾠwith. ﾠ
The ﾠPeople's ﾠBank ﾠof ﾠChina, ﾠthe ﾠcountry's ﾠcentral ﾠbank, ﾠclassifies ﾠbanks ﾠby ﾠ
ownership ﾠ structure. ﾠ  ﾠ Three ﾠ important ﾠ banks ﾠ ʹ ﾠ the ﾠ China ﾠ Development ﾠ Bank, ﾠ
Export-ﾭ‐Import ﾠ Bank ﾠ of ﾠ China, ﾠ and ﾠ Agriculture ﾠ Development ﾠ Bank ﾠ of ﾠ China ﾠ ʹ ﾠ are ﾠ
classified ﾠas ﾠ"policy ﾠbanks." ﾠ ﾠThese ﾠremain ﾠfully ﾠand ﾠdirectly ﾠowned ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠstate, ﾠ
and ﾠ are ﾠ intended ﾠ as ﾠ tools ﾠ for ﾠ state ﾠ intervention ﾠ in ﾠ the ﾠ economy. ﾠ  ﾠ Another ﾠ four ﾠ
major ﾠbanks ﾠʹ ﾠthe ﾠIndustrial ﾠand ﾠCommercial ﾠBank ﾠof ﾠChina, ﾠChina ﾠConstruction ﾠBank, ﾠ
Agricultural ﾠ Bank ﾠ of ﾠ China, ﾠ and ﾠ Bank ﾠ of ﾠ China ﾠ ʹ ﾠ are ﾠ classified ﾠ as ﾠ "state-ﾭ‐owned ﾠ
commercial ﾠ banks." ﾠ ﾠThese ﾠ were ﾠ corporatized ﾠ and ﾠ subsequently ﾠ listed, ﾠ but ﾠ have ﾠ
long ﾠ histories ﾠ of ﾠ state ﾠ control ﾠ with ﾠ the ﾠ Ministry ﾠ of ﾠ Finance ﾠ and ﾠ Central ﾠ Huijin ﾠ
Investment ﾠLtd ﾠholding ﾠsufficient ﾠequity ﾠblocks ﾠto ﾠlock ﾠin ﾠstate ﾠcontrol. ﾠ  ﾠ Thirteen ﾠ
other ﾠmajor ﾠbanks ﾠare ﾠclassified ﾠas ﾠ"joint ﾠstock ﾠcommercial ﾠbanks." ﾠ ﾠEleven ﾠof ﾠthese ﾠ
have ﾠa ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE, ﾠL-ﾭ‐SOE, ﾠor ﾠsubnational ﾠgovernment ﾠorgan ﾠas ﾠtheir ﾠlargest ﾠshareholder.
17 ﾠ  ﾠ
Rural ﾠ credit ﾠ cooperation ﾠ associations, ﾠ city ﾠ commercial ﾠ banks, ﾠ foreign ﾠ banks, ﾠ and ﾠ
certain ﾠother ﾠfinancial ﾠinstitutions ﾠfall ﾠoutside ﾠthese ﾠcategories. ﾠ  ﾠ Thus, ﾠeighteen ﾠof ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
17 ﾠ The ﾠcentral ﾠgovernment, ﾠeither ﾠdirectly ﾠor ﾠvia ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs, ﾠis ﾠthe ﾠlargest ﾠshareholder ﾠin ﾠfive ﾠof ﾠthese: ﾠthe ﾠ
Bank ﾠ Of ﾠ Communications, ﾠ China ﾠ Citic ﾠ Bank, ﾠ China ﾠ Everbright ﾠ Bank, ﾠ Huaxia ﾠ Bank ﾠ and ﾠ China ﾠ
Merchants ﾠ Bank). ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ other ﾠ six, ﾠ with ﾠ local ﾠ governments ﾠ as ﾠ the ﾠ largest ﾠ shareholder, ﾠ are ﾠ the ﾠ
Industrial ﾠBank, ﾠGuangdong ﾠDevelopment ﾠBank, ﾠShanghai ﾠPudong ﾠDevelopment ﾠBank, ﾠEvergrowing ﾠ
Bank, ﾠChina ﾠZheshang ﾠBank ﾠand ﾠChina ﾠBohai ﾠBank. ﾠ ﾠ
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the ﾠ twenty ﾠ largest ﾠ banks ﾠ are ﾠ directly ﾠ State ﾠ controlled ﾠ and, ﾠ at ﾠ the ﾠ end ﾠ of ﾠ 2009, ﾠ
accounted ﾠfor ﾠRMB58.58 ﾠtrillion, ﾠor ﾠabout ﾠ73% ﾠof ﾠtotal ﾠbank ﾠassets ﾠ(Table ﾠ3). ﾠ
===Insert ﾠTable ﾠ3 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
 ﾠ
3. ﾠ  ﾠ China's ﾠSOE ﾠMacroeconomic ﾠPolicy ﾠChannel ﾠ
3.1 ﾠ  ﾠ SOEs' ﾠResponses ﾠto ﾠStimulus ﾠ
Figure ﾠ4 ﾠshows ﾠhow ﾠthe ﾠglobal ﾠfinancial ﾠcrisis ﾠhit ﾠChina's ﾠfinance ﾠsector. ﾠ  ﾠ China's ﾠ
bankers' ﾠconfidence ﾠindex, ﾠbased ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠPeople's ﾠBank ﾠof ﾠChina's ﾠquarterly ﾠsurvey ﾠof ﾠ
about ﾠ3,000 ﾠcity-ﾭ‐ ﾠor ﾠhigher-ﾭ‐level ﾠbank ﾠbranch ﾠmanagers, ﾠdropped ﾠsharply ﾠin ﾠ2008 ﾠQ4, ﾠ
and ﾠbottomed ﾠout ﾠin ﾠ2009 ﾠQ1. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
Amid ﾠ this ﾠ drop ﾠ in ﾠ banker ﾠ confidence, ﾠ the ﾠ government ﾠ announced ﾠ an ﾠ
expansionary ﾠ shift ﾠ in ﾠ monetary ﾠ policy; ﾠ and ﾠ China's ﾠ four ﾠ state-ﾭ‐owned ﾠ commercial ﾠ
banks ﾠ and ﾠ thirteen ﾠ joint-ﾭ‐stock ﾠ commercial ﾠ banks ﾠ immediately ﾠ initiated ﾠ a ﾠ huge ﾠ
volume ﾠof ﾠnew ﾠloans ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠ1
st ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ2009 ﾠ(Figure ﾠ4). ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠfour ﾠstate-ﾭ‐owned ﾠ
commercial ﾠ banks' ﾠ total ﾠ loan ﾠ balance ﾠ rose ﾠ by ﾠ RMB2.31 ﾠ trillion ﾠ in ﾠ that ﾠ quarter, ﾠ
substantially ﾠmore ﾠthan ﾠthe ﾠ1.80 ﾠtrillion ﾠincrease ﾠover ﾠthe ﾠentire ﾠyear ﾠof ﾠ2008, ﾠand ﾠ
increased ﾠby ﾠRMB4.10 ﾠtrillion ﾠover ﾠthe ﾠfull ﾠyear ﾠof ﾠ2009. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠraised ﾠtheir ﾠshare ﾠof ﾠ
total ﾠloan ﾠvolume ﾠfrom ﾠ36.78% ﾠin ﾠ2008 ﾠto ﾠ42.73% ﾠin ﾠ2009, ﾠabruptly ﾠreversing ﾠtheir ﾠ
steady ﾠloss ﾠof ﾠmarket ﾠshare ﾠto ﾠcity ﾠcommercial ﾠbanks ﾠand ﾠforeign ﾠbanks. ﾠ  ﾠ China's ﾠ ﾠ
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joint-ﾭ‐stock ﾠcommercial ﾠbanks ﾠlikewise ﾠincreased ﾠtheir ﾠloans ﾠoutstanding ﾠby ﾠRMB1.18 ﾠ
trillion ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠ1
st ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ2009 ﾠand ﾠRMB2.23 ﾠtrillion ﾠover ﾠin ﾠthat ﾠwhole ﾠyear. ﾠ
===Insert ﾠFigure ﾠ4 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
The ﾠ global ﾠ downturn ﾠ also ﾠ hurt ﾠ non-ﾭ‐financial ﾠ SOEs ﾠ badly. ﾠ  ﾠ State ﾠ Council ﾠ
SASAC's ﾠstatistics ﾠfor ﾠ2008 ﾠshow ﾠnon-ﾭ‐financial ﾠSOEs' ﾠprofits ﾠdecreased ﾠby ﾠ24.5% ﾠat ﾠ
the ﾠnational ﾠlevel, ﾠwith ﾠ45.5% ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠSOEs ﾠsuffering ﾠlosses. ﾠ  ﾠ Both ﾠROS ﾠand ﾠprofits ﾠ
were ﾠin ﾠdeep ﾠtroughs ﾠin ﾠ2008, ﾠand ﾠneither ﾠimproved ﾠuntil ﾠ2009 ﾠQ3 ﾠ(see ﾠFigure ﾠ5). ﾠ
The ﾠperformance ﾠof ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs, ﾠalso ﾠtracked ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠSASAC, ﾠshows ﾠa ﾠsimilar ﾠ
pattern. ﾠ  ﾠ China's ﾠentrepreneur ﾠ confidence ﾠ index, ﾠ based ﾠ on ﾠ a ﾠNational ﾠ Bureau ﾠ of ﾠ
Statistics ﾠquarterly ﾠnationwide ﾠsurvey ﾠof ﾠ20,000 ﾠenterprise ﾠmanagers, ﾠhit ﾠa ﾠhistoric ﾠ
low ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠstart ﾠof ﾠ2009 ﾠ(Figure ﾠ6). ﾠ  ﾠ Nonetheless, ﾠthese ﾠtoo ﾠstepped ﾠforth ﾠto ﾠdo ﾠ
their ﾠbit. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
Non-ﾭ‐financial ﾠSOEs ﾠresponded ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠgovernment's ﾠcall ﾠfor ﾠeconomic ﾠstimulus ﾠ
with ﾠa ﾠprompt ﾠand ﾠsubstantial ﾠhike ﾠin ﾠinvestment. ﾠ  ﾠ Prior ﾠto ﾠ2008, ﾠSOEs' ﾠannualized ﾠ
real ﾠgrowth ﾠrate ﾠin ﾠfixed ﾠasset ﾠinvestment ﾠtypically ﾠlagged ﾠthat ﾠof ﾠnon-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠby ﾠabout ﾠ
ten ﾠpercentage ﾠpoints ﾠ(Figure ﾠ6). ﾠ  ﾠ But ﾠthis ﾠgrowth ﾠrate ﾠincreased ﾠsharply ﾠʹ ﾠfrom ﾠ
21.09% ﾠin ﾠ2008 ﾠQ4 ﾠto ﾠ38.50% ﾠin ﾠ2009 ﾠQ1 ﾠand ﾠ45.30% ﾠin ﾠ2009 ﾠQ2. ﾠ  ﾠ Across ﾠall ﾠfour ﾠ
quarters ﾠ of ﾠ 2009, ﾠ the ﾠ SOEs' ﾠ fixed ﾠ asset ﾠ investment ﾠ growth ﾠ rate ﾠ remained ﾠ
substantially ﾠhigher ﾠthan ﾠnormal. ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠcontrast, ﾠnon-ﾭ‐SOEs' ﾠannualized ﾠgrowth ﾠrate ﾠin ﾠ




===Insert ﾠFigure ﾠ5 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
===Insert ﾠFigure ﾠ6 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
With ﾠ banker ﾠ and ﾠ entrepreneur ﾠ confidence ﾠ indexes ﾠ dragging ﾠ at ﾠ or ﾠ near ﾠ
historic ﾠlows, ﾠand ﾠwith ﾠbanks ﾠand ﾠnonfinancial ﾠSOEs ﾠnavigating ﾠthrough ﾠincreasingly ﾠ
choppy ﾠbusiness ﾠenvironments, ﾠthese ﾠsudden ﾠexpansions ﾠin ﾠlending ﾠand ﾠinvestment ﾠ
were ﾠ unlikely ﾠ to ﾠ be ﾠ driven ﾠ by ﾠ enterprise ﾠ profit ﾠ maximization. ﾠ  ﾠ Rather, ﾠ the ﾠ top ﾠ
executives ﾠ at ﾠ SOE ﾠ banks ﾠ and ﾠ nonfinancial ﾠ SOEs ﾠ were ﾠ instructed ﾠ to ﾠ pursue ﾠ these ﾠ
policies ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠgovernment. ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
The ﾠ SASACs ﾠ made ﾠ "contributions ﾠ to ﾠ the ﾠ stimulus ﾠ plan" ﾠ a ﾠ new ﾠ corporate ﾠ
performance ﾠobjective, ﾠas ﾠhighlighted ﾠin ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠSASAC's ﾠ2009 ﾠannual ﾠreport, ﾠ
to ﾠ be ﾠ used ﾠ in ﾠ evaluating ﾠ SOE ﾠ executives; ﾠ and ﾠ most ﾠ SOE ﾠ banks' ﾠ and ﾠ nonfinancial ﾠ
enterprises' ﾠ annual ﾠ reports, ﾠ or ﾠ similar ﾠ documents, ﾠ echo ﾠ this. ﾠ  ﾠ Senior ﾠ Chinese ﾠ
government ﾠofficials' ﾠspeeches ﾠexhorted ﾠSOEs ﾠto ﾠ"serve ﾠthe ﾠcountry's ﾠinterest", ﾠand ﾠ
the ﾠOrganization ﾠDepartment ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠCCP ﾠweighed ﾠobedience ﾠto ﾠParty ﾠthought ﾠheavily ﾠ
in ﾠpromoting, ﾠrenewing, ﾠor ﾠdemoting ﾠSOE ﾠexecutives. ﾠ  ﾠ Thus, ﾠresponding ﾠquickly ﾠand ﾠ
meaningfully ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠgovernment's ﾠmacroeconomic ﾠstimulus ﾠbecame ﾠan ﾠSOE's ﾠ"policy ﾠ




3.2 ﾠ  ﾠ Potential ﾠProblems ﾠwith ﾠthe ﾠSOE ﾠChannel ﾠ
The ﾠdual ﾠobjectives ﾠassigned ﾠmanagers ﾠof ﾠSOE ﾠbanks ﾠand ﾠnonfinancial ﾠSOEs ﾠʹ ﾠto ﾠ
advance ﾠ the ﾠ government's ﾠ political ﾠ objectives ﾠ and ﾠ optimize ﾠ SOE ﾠ financial ﾠ
performance ﾠʹ ﾠremained ﾠin ﾠeffect ﾠas ﾠSOEs ﾠfulfilled ﾠthese ﾠpolicy ﾠburdens. ﾠ  ﾠ Assessing ﾠ
borrowers ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠbasis ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠlikely ﾠfinancial ﾠviability ﾠof ﾠtheir ﾠinvestment ﾠplans ﾠis ﾠ
time ﾠconsuming ﾠand ﾠrequires ﾠexpensive ﾠexpertise. ﾠ  ﾠ Given ﾠthe ﾠgovernment's ﾠpolicy ﾠ
directive ﾠ to ﾠ increase ﾠ lending ﾠ immediately ﾠ and ﾠ substantially, ﾠ careful ﾠ evaluation ﾠ of ﾠ
lending ﾠ decisions ﾠ was ﾠ almost ﾠ certainly ﾠ simply ﾠ not ﾠ possible. ﾠ  ﾠ Rational ﾠ SOE ﾠ bank ﾠ
executives ﾠwould ﾠdoubtless ﾠobey ﾠthe ﾠdirective, ﾠbut ﾠperhaps ﾠin ﾠways ﾠthat ﾠminimize ﾠ
damage ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠfinancial ﾠperformance ﾠof ﾠtheir ﾠbanks, ﾠthereby ﾠprotecting ﾠtheir ﾠannual ﾠ
bonus ﾠpackages ﾠand ﾠtheir ﾠpromotion ﾠprospects ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠend ﾠof ﾠtheir ﾠthree-ﾭ‐year ﾠterms ﾠ
in ﾠtheir ﾠcurrent ﾠpositions. ﾠ  ﾠ SOE ﾠBanks, ﾠobliged ﾠto ﾠissue ﾠhuge ﾠvolume ﾠof ﾠloans, ﾠwould ﾠ
thus ﾠfavor ﾠborrowers ﾠperceived ﾠas ﾠunlikely ﾠto ﾠdefault, ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠnear ﾠfuture. ﾠ  ﾠ
For ﾠseveral ﾠreasons, ﾠbankers ﾠsaw ﾠlarge ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠas ﾠpreferred ﾠborrowers. ﾠ  ﾠ First, ﾠ
large ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠwere ﾠwidely ﾠthought ﾠ"too ﾠbig ﾠto ﾠfail". ﾠ  ﾠ If ﾠthe ﾠdownturn ﾠproved ﾠlong ﾠ
and ﾠdeep, ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠwas ﾠlikely ﾠto ﾠsave ﾠthem ﾠfrom ﾠserious ﾠtrouble. ﾠ  ﾠ Second, ﾠlending ﾠ
to ﾠlarge ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠwas ﾠ"politically ﾠcorrect." ﾠ ﾠNonperforming ﾠloans ﾠto ﾠother ﾠborrowers, ﾠ
especially ﾠprivate ﾠ corporations, ﾠ would ﾠ leave ﾠ SOE ﾠ bankers ﾠ open ﾠ to ﾠ criticism. ﾠ  ﾠ But ﾠ
decisions ﾠto ﾠlet ﾠSOEs, ﾠespecially ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs, ﾠrenege ﾠon ﾠdebts ﾠwould ﾠbe ﾠmade ﾠby ﾠhigh ﾠ
government ﾠ and ﾠ party ﾠ officials, ﾠ sheltering ﾠ SOE ﾠ bankers ﾠ from ﾠ blame. ﾠ  ﾠ Such ﾠ ﾠ
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reasoning ﾠappears ﾠto ﾠhave ﾠbeen ﾠpersuasive, ﾠfor ﾠlisted ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠreceived ﾠnearly ﾠ60% ﾠof ﾠ
all ﾠnew ﾠloans ﾠto ﾠall ﾠcompanies ﾠlisted ﾠin ﾠmainland ﾠexchanges ﾠin ﾠ2009.
18 ﾠ
The ﾠmanagers ﾠof ﾠnonfinancial ﾠSOEs, ﾠhaving ﾠborrowed ﾠthese ﾠfunds, ﾠhad ﾠto ﾠ
invest ﾠthem ﾠquickly ﾠto ﾠdemonstrate ﾠadherence ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠgovernment's ﾠstimulus ﾠplan, ﾠ
but ﾠ also ﾠ avoid ﾠdamaging ﾠ the ﾠfinancial ﾠperformance ﾠ of ﾠ their ﾠ SOEs, ﾠ and ﾠ thus ﾠ their ﾠ
bonus ﾠincome ﾠstreams. ﾠ  ﾠ Like ﾠthe ﾠtop ﾠmanagers ﾠof ﾠSOE ﾠbanks, ﾠnonfinancial ﾠSOEs ﾠare ﾠ
evaluated ﾠannually ﾠfor ﾠbonuses ﾠand ﾠtriennially ﾠfor ﾠpromotions. ﾠ  ﾠ Investments ﾠthat ﾠ
would ﾠnot ﾠshow ﾠmajor ﾠproblems ﾠfor ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠthree ﾠyears ﾠwere ﾠthus ﾠneeded. ﾠ
Large ﾠcorporate ﾠcapital ﾠinvestments ﾠrequire ﾠcareful ﾠplanning, ﾠforecasting, ﾠrisk ﾠ
assessment, ﾠ and ﾠ other ﾠ financial ﾠ analysis; ﾠ and ﾠ this ﾠ too ﾠ takes ﾠ time ﾠ and ﾠ money. ﾠ  ﾠ
Formulating ﾠ profitable ﾠ capital ﾠ investments ﾠ is ﾠ daunting ﾠ under ﾠ normal ﾠ conditions; ﾠ
amid ﾠ a ﾠ global ﾠ economic ﾠ downturn, ﾠ the ﾠ task ﾠ can ﾠ be ﾠ petrifying. ﾠ Nonfinancial ﾠ SOE ﾠ
managers ﾠwere ﾠthus ﾠhesitant ﾠto ﾠinvest ﾠin ﾠproperty, ﾠplant, ﾠand ﾠequipment ﾠassociated ﾠ
with ﾠtheir ﾠprimary ﾠlines ﾠof ﾠbusiness; ﾠfearing ﾠthat ﾠsuch ﾠinvestments ﾠwould ﾠdo ﾠpoorly ﾠ
in ﾠthe ﾠnear-ﾭ‐term ﾠfuture. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠNational ﾠBureau ﾠof ﾠStatistics ﾠestimates ﾠthe ﾠmean ﾠROA ﾠ
of ﾠ23 ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ38 ﾠindustrial ﾠsectors ﾠit ﾠcovers ﾠas ﾠbelow ﾠthe ﾠloan ﾠinterest ﾠrate ﾠ(5.31%) ﾠin ﾠ
2008. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
Thus, ﾠnonfinancial ﾠSOE ﾠmanagers ﾠneeded ﾠnontraditional ﾠinvestments ﾠwhose ﾠ
returns ﾠwould ﾠlikely ﾠcover ﾠtheir ﾠborrowing ﾠcosts ﾠ ʹ ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠuntil ﾠpositive ﾠtriennial ﾠ
evaluations ﾠmoved ﾠthem ﾠon ﾠto ﾠhigher ﾠpositions ﾠelsewhere ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠeconomy. ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
18 ﾠ ^ŽƵƌĐĞ͗ƵƚŚŽƌ͛Đalculation ﾠbased ﾠon ﾠannual ﾠreport ﾠdata ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠGenius ﾠFinance ﾠDatabase. ﾠ ﾠ
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Real ﾠ estate ﾠ seemed ﾠ to ﾠ fill ﾠ this ﾠ bill ﾠ for ﾠ several ﾠ reasons. ﾠ  ﾠ First, ﾠ real ﾠ estate ﾠ
prices ﾠ in ﾠ major ﾠ cities ﾠ rose ﾠ steadily ﾠ over ﾠ the ﾠ preceding ﾠ years, ﾠ making ﾠ residential ﾠ
construction ﾠ one ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ most ﾠ profitable ﾠ industries. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ two ﾠ latest ﾠ economic ﾠ
censuses ﾠshow ﾠthe ﾠROS ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠsector ﾠrising ﾠfaster ﾠthan ﾠin ﾠany ﾠother ﾠsector ﾠ
ʹ ﾠfrom ﾠ8.31% ﾠin ﾠ2004 ﾠto ﾠ12.62% ﾠin ﾠ2008, ﾠwhen ﾠit ﾠranked ﾠthird ﾠin ﾠprofitability, ﾠbehind ﾠ
only ﾠ"mining" ﾠand ﾠ"other ﾠservices". ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠmajor ﾠcities ﾠwith ﾠhot ﾠhousing ﾠmarkets, ﾠthe ﾠ
sector's ﾠROS ﾠwas ﾠeven ﾠhigher ﾠin ﾠ2008, ﾠreaching ﾠ14.99% ﾠin ﾠBeijing ﾠand ﾠ17.90% ﾠin ﾠ
Shanghai. ﾠ  ﾠ Second, ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠis ﾠrelatively ﾠeasy ﾠto ﾠenter, ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠcompared ﾠto ﾠother ﾠ
highly ﾠprofitable ﾠindustries. ﾠ  ﾠ For ﾠexample, ﾠentering ﾠ"mining", ﾠthe ﾠmost ﾠprofitable ﾠ
sector, ﾠrequires ﾠlocating ﾠand ﾠdeveloping ﾠore ﾠdeposits; ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠsector ﾠis, ﾠin ﾠany ﾠevent, ﾠ
given ﾠover ﾠto ﾠstate-ﾭ‐licensed ﾠmonopolies. ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠcontrast, ﾠany ﾠnonfinancial ﾠSOE ﾠwith ﾠ
ready ﾠcash ﾠmight ﾠtake ﾠto ﾠbuying ﾠland ﾠor ﾠresidential ﾠapartment ﾠblocks, ﾠand ﾠeven ﾠto ﾠ
building ﾠthem, ﾠwith ﾠsome ﾠhope ﾠof ﾠfinancial ﾠsuccess. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
Accordingly, ﾠmany ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs, ﾠobeying ﾠpolitical ﾠdirectives ﾠto ﾠhike ﾠtheir ﾠborrowing ﾠ
from ﾠSOE ﾠbanks ﾠand ﾠinvest, ﾠopted ﾠto ﾠinvest ﾠreal ﾠestate. ﾠ  ﾠ While ﾠSASAC ﾠguidelines ﾠlist ﾠ
only ﾠ16 ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠwith ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠdevelopment ﾠas ﾠcore ﾠbusiness, ﾠthese ﾠand ﾠ78 ﾠother ﾠ
C-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠowned ﾠor ﾠcontrolled ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠdevelopers ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠend ﾠof ﾠ2009. ﾠ  ﾠ Most ﾠof ﾠ
these ﾠconcentrated ﾠon ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠin ﾠa ﾠfew ﾠmajor ﾠcities, ﾠwhere ﾠtheir ﾠbuying ﾠpushed ﾠ
up ﾠ lot ﾠ prices ﾠ substantially. ﾠ  ﾠ Indeed, ﾠ C-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠ land ﾠ purchases ﾠ are ﾠ widely ﾠ thought ﾠ
responsible ﾠfor ﾠland ﾠand ﾠhousing ﾠprice ﾠsurges ﾠthese ﾠcities ﾠexperienced ﾠduring ﾠthe ﾠ




4. ﾠ  ﾠ Land ﾠTransaction ﾠData ﾠ
All ﾠurban ﾠland ﾠwas ﾠnationalized ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠfounding ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠPeople's ﾠRepublic ﾠof ﾠChina ﾠin ﾠ
1949. ﾠ  ﾠ Under ﾠthe ﾠConstitutional ﾠAmendment ﾠof ﾠ1988, ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠretains ﾠultimate ﾠ
ownership ﾠof ﾠurban ﾠland, ﾠbut ﾠallows ﾠindividuals ﾠand ﾠenterprises ﾠto ﾠlease ﾠland ﾠuse ﾠ
rights ﾠ for ﾠ specified ﾠ periods. ﾠ  ﾠ For ﾠ example, ﾠ residential ﾠ lot ﾠ leases ﾠ typically ﾠ last ﾠ 70 ﾠ
years. ﾠ  ﾠ A ﾠprivate ﾠhousing ﾠdevelopment ﾠproject ﾠmight ﾠinvolve ﾠa ﾠdeveloper ﾠleasing ﾠ
lots ﾠfrom ﾠa ﾠlocal ﾠgovernment, ﾠbuilding ﾠhousing ﾠunits ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠlots, ﾠand ﾠthen ﾠselling ﾠthe ﾠ
developed ﾠunits. ﾠ  ﾠ A ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠmadate, ﾠissued ﾠin ﾠ2002 ﾠand ﾠreiterated ﾠin ﾠ2004, ﾠ
requires ﾠthat ﾠleases ﾠfor ﾠurban ﾠlots ﾠdesignated ﾠfor ﾠresidential ﾠdevelopment ﾠbe ﾠsold ﾠat ﾠ
auctions.
19 ﾠ ﾠIn ﾠmost ﾠcases, ﾠthe ﾠdeveloper ﾠentering ﾠthe ﾠhighest ﾠbid ﾠgets ﾠthe ﾠlease.
 ﾠ ﾠ
We ﾠ collect ﾠ land ﾠ parcel ﾠauction ﾠdata ﾠ in ﾠ eight ﾠ major ﾠ Chinese ﾠ cities: ﾠ Beijing, ﾠ
Chengdu, ﾠHangzhou, ﾠShanghai, ﾠShenzhen, ﾠTianjin, ﾠWuhan, ﾠand ﾠXian. ﾠ  ﾠ These ﾠare ﾠall ﾠ
large ﾠcities, ﾠwith ﾠrelatively ﾠdeveloped ﾠeconomies ﾠand ﾠhousing ﾠmarkets. ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠ2009, ﾠ
their ﾠcombined ﾠGDPs ﾠconstituted ﾠ17.3% ﾠof ﾠChina's ﾠGDP, ﾠand ﾠ35% ﾠof ﾠnew ﾠhome ﾠsales ﾠ
occurred ﾠwithin ﾠthe ﾠnation.
20 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
Our ﾠdata, ﾠfrom ﾠ the ﾠ Soufun ﾠDatabase ﾠ and ﾠlocal ﾠ land ﾠ resources ﾠ authorities' ﾠ
websites, ﾠcontain ﾠ3,542 ﾠland ﾠtransaction ﾠrecords.
21 ﾠ ﾠThese ﾠinclude ﾠall ﾠsuch ﾠpublic ﾠ
residential ﾠland ﾠlease ﾠsales ﾠin ﾠthese ﾠeight ﾠcities ﾠfrom ﾠ2003 ﾠQ1 ﾠthrough ﾠ2010 ﾠQ1, ﾠ
except ﾠ leases ﾠ for ﾠ land ﾠ entirely ﾠ designated ﾠ for ﾠ public ﾠ housing, ﾠ which ﾠ we ﾠ exclude ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
19 ﾠ Three ﾠvariants ﾠare ﾠpermitted: ﾠone-ﾭ‐stage ﾠauction, ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐stage ﾠauction, ﾠand ﾠan ﾠalternative ﾠbidding ﾠ
process. ﾠ  ﾠ See ﾠCai, ﾠHenderson ﾠand ﾠZhang ﾠ(2009) ﾠfor ﾠdetails. ﾠ
20 ﾠ Calculation ﾠbased ﾠon ﾠNation ﾠBureau ﾠof ﾠStatistics ﾠdata ﾠand ﾠmunicipal ﾠstatistics ﾠfor ﾠeach ﾠcity. ﾠ
21 ﾠ Soufun ﾠis ﾠa ﾠleading ﾠChinese ﾠdata ﾠvendor ﾠspecialized ﾠin ﾠland ﾠand ﾠhousing ﾠtransaction ﾠdata. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ͛ƐǁĞďƐŝƚĞŝƐfdc.soufun.com. ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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because ﾠtheir ﾠprices ﾠare ﾠdetermined ﾠusing ﾠother ﾠmechanisms. ﾠ ﾠIn ﾠApril ﾠ2010, ﾠwith ﾠ
China's ﾠ economic ﾠ recovery ﾠ seemingly ﾠ drawing ﾠ to ﾠ a ﾠ successful ﾠ conclusion, ﾠ with ﾠ
America's ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠbubble ﾠstill ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠnews, ﾠand ﾠwith ﾠhigh ﾠand ﾠrising ﾠurban ﾠland ﾠ
prices ﾠattracting ﾠattention, ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠCouncil ﾠSASAC ﾠexplicitly ﾠdiscouraged ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs, ﾠ
especially ﾠ those ﾠ for ﾠ which ﾠ real ﾠ estate ﾠ is ﾠ not ﾠ a ﾠ core ﾠ business, ﾠ from ﾠ further ﾠ
participation ﾠin ﾠlease ﾠauctions. ﾠ  ﾠ Our ﾠdata ﾠthus ﾠincludes ﾠthe ﾠperiod ﾠin ﾠwhich ﾠChina's ﾠ
macroeconomic ﾠstimulus ﾠwas ﾠin ﾠhigh ﾠgear, ﾠand ﾠin ﾠwhich ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠinvestment ﾠoptions ﾠ
were ﾠunrestricted. ﾠ  ﾠ Table ﾠ4 ﾠdescribes ﾠthe ﾠdistribution ﾠof ﾠthese ﾠtransactions ﾠacross ﾠ
the ﾠeight ﾠmajor ﾠcities ﾠwe ﾠstudy. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
===Insert ﾠTable ﾠ4 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
Our ﾠdata ﾠinclude ﾠeach ﾠland ﾠparcel's ﾠlocation ﾠand ﾠphysical ﾠattributes ﾠas ﾠwell ﾠas ﾠ
its ﾠsale ﾠprice ﾠand ﾠdate. ﾠ  ﾠ For ﾠeach ﾠparcel, ﾠwe ﾠascertain ﾠthe ﾠbuyer's ﾠcharacteristics ﾠ
from ﾠthe ﾠeight ﾠcities' ﾠmunicipal ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠauthority ﾠdatabases. ﾠ  ﾠ These ﾠclassify ﾠeach ﾠ
buyer ﾠas ﾠa ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE, ﾠL-ﾭ‐SOE, ﾠor ﾠnon-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠand, ﾠwithin ﾠeach ﾠclassification, ﾠassign ﾠthe ﾠbuyers ﾠ
grades, ﾠfrom ﾠone ﾠ(highest) ﾠthrough ﾠfive ﾠ(lowest), ﾠaccording ﾠto ﾠsize ﾠand ﾠexperience ﾠas ﾠ
a ﾠ developer. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠ also ﾠ lets ﾠ us ﾠ distinguish ﾠ listed ﾠ from ﾠ unlisted ﾠ buyers. ﾠ  ﾠ Table ﾠ 5 ﾠ
displays ﾠthe ﾠdefinitions ﾠand ﾠdescriptive ﾠstatistics ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠvariables ﾠso ﾠconstructed. ﾠ  ﾠ
===Insert ﾠTable ﾠ5 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ ﾠ
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A ﾠ cursory ﾠ inspection ﾠ of ﾠ our ﾠ data ﾠ supports ﾠ the ﾠ thesis ﾠ that ﾠ SOEs ﾠ abruptly ﾠ
increased ﾠ their ﾠ activity ﾠ in ﾠ the ﾠ real ﾠ estate ﾠ development ﾠ business ﾠ as ﾠ the ﾠ
macroeconomic ﾠ stimulus ﾠ package ﾠ was ﾠ unfolded. ﾠ  ﾠ Figure ﾠ 7 ﾠ shows ﾠ SOEs' ﾠ market ﾠ
share ﾠ as ﾠ low, ﾠ with ﾠ non-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠ developers ﾠdominating ﾠthe ﾠ market, ﾠuntil ﾠ2008; ﾠ after ﾠ
which ﾠ SOEs, ﾠ and ﾠ especially ﾠ C-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠ rapidly ﾠ become ﾠ major ﾠ players. ﾠ  ﾠ C-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠ
developers' ﾠshare ﾠby ﾠtotal ﾠvalue ﾠrose ﾠfrom ﾠabout ﾠ15% ﾠin ﾠ2008 ﾠto ﾠabout ﾠ23% ﾠin ﾠ2009, ﾠ
and ﾠa ﾠhistoric ﾠhigh ﾠof ﾠabout ﾠ33% ﾠin ﾠ2010 ﾠQ1. ﾠ  ﾠ
===Insert ﾠFigure ﾠ7 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
Table ﾠ6 ﾠreveals ﾠsubstantial ﾠvariation ﾠacross ﾠcities ﾠin ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠentry. ﾠ ﾠIn ﾠBeijing, ﾠ
their ﾠfavorite ﾠmarket, ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠroughly ﾠdoubled ﾠtheir ﾠmarket ﾠshare ﾠfrom ﾠits ﾠhistoric ﾠ
level ﾠor ﾠroughly ﾠ24% ﾠto ﾠ53.54% ﾠin ﾠ2009 ﾠand ﾠ2010 ﾠQ1, ﾠwhen ﾠthe ﾠstimulus ﾠpackage ﾠwas ﾠ
unfolded. ﾠ  ﾠ Simultaneous ﾠ surges ﾠ in ﾠ market ﾠ shares ﾠ are ﾠ also ﾠ clearly ﾠ evident ﾠ in ﾠ
Shanghai, ﾠChengdu, ﾠand ﾠTianjin, ﾠbut ﾠless ﾠso ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠother ﾠfour ﾠcities. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ




5. ﾠ  ﾠ Empirical ﾠAnalysis ﾠof ﾠLand ﾠAuctions ﾠin ﾠEight ﾠMajor ﾠCities ﾠ
5.1 ﾠ  ﾠ Hedonic ﾠModel ﾠof ﾠConstant ﾠQuality ﾠPrice ﾠIndex ﾠ
Our ﾠfirst ﾠobjective ﾠis ﾠto ﾠunderstand ﾠwhether ﾠchanges ﾠin ﾠland ﾠparcel ﾠprices ﾠare ﾠrelated ﾠ
to ﾠthe ﾠstimulation ﾠpackages. ﾠ  ﾠ To ﾠcompare ﾠthe ﾠprice ﾠof ﾠheterogeneous ﾠland ﾠparcels, ﾠ
we ﾠuse ﾠa ﾠpooled ﾠhedonic ﾠland ﾠpricing ﾠmodel. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠdependent ﾠvariable ﾠis ﾠtransaction ﾠ
price ﾠfor ﾠeach ﾠparcel ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠlogarithmic ﾠform ﾠ(in ﾠconstant ﾠ2003 ﾠRMB) ﾠmeasured ﾠas ﾠ
the ﾠprice ﾠper ﾠsquare ﾠmeter ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠpermitted ﾠhousing ﾠfloor ﾠspace.
22 ﾠ ﾠTo ﾠcontrol ﾠfor ﾠ
quality ﾠ variation, ﾠ we ﾠ include ﾠ the ﾠ distance ﾠ to ﾠ the ﾠ city ﾠ center ﾠ (D_CENTER), ﾠ the ﾠ
permitted ﾠ building ﾠ density ﾠ expressed ﾠ as ﾠ permitted ﾠ floor ﾠ space ﾠ over ﾠ land ﾠ area ﾠ
(DENSITY), ﾠ and ﾠ requirements ﾠ to ﾠ provide ﾠ public ﾠ housing ﾠ units ﾠ on ﾠ the ﾠ parcel ﾠ
(SHARE_PH). ﾠ  ﾠ We ﾠexpect ﾠall ﾠthree ﾠto ﾠcorrelate ﾠnegatively ﾠwith ﾠa ﾠparcel's ﾠprice. ﾠ  ﾠ We ﾠ
also ﾠcontrol ﾠfor ﾠsite ﾠquality ﾠat ﾠdelivery, ﾠmeasured ﾠby ﾠwhether ﾠthe ﾠland ﾠis ﾠleveled ﾠor ﾠ
not ﾠ(LANDLEVEL), ﾠand ﾠexpect ﾠhigher ﾠprices ﾠfor ﾠleveled ﾠland. ﾠ  ﾠ We ﾠalso ﾠcontrol ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠ
parcel's ﾠsize ﾠ(SIZE), ﾠrequirement ﾠto ﾠbuild ﾠpublic ﾠutilities ﾠsuch ﾠas ﾠschool ﾠor ﾠhospital ﾠon ﾠ
the ﾠparcel ﾠ(PUBLIC), ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠform ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠtransaction ﾠ(AUCTION ﾠfor ﾠone-ﾭ‐stage ﾠauction ﾠ
and ﾠBIDDING ﾠfor ﾠa ﾠbidding ﾠprocess, ﾠwith ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐stage ﾠauctions ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠleft-ﾭ‐out ﾠcategory). ﾠ  ﾠ
All ﾠregressions ﾠinclude ﾠcity ﾠand ﾠquarter ﾠfixed ﾠeffects. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
Table ﾠ7 ﾠreports ﾠthe ﾠresults ﾠof ﾠour ﾠbasic ﾠhedonic ﾠmodel, ﾠestimated ﾠby ﾠOLS ﾠ
(column ﾠ1), ﾠsandwich ﾠestimator ﾠallowing ﾠfor ﾠclustering ﾠby ﾠcity ﾠ(White ﾠ1980; ﾠcolumn ﾠ
2), ﾠand ﾠrandom ﾠeffect ﾠregression ﾠ(column ﾠ3), ﾠrespectively. ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
22 ﾠ Note ﾠthat ﾠin ﾠChina, ﾠland ﾠparcels ﾠof ﾠresidential ﾠuse ﾠare ﾠalways ﾠpriced ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠfloor ﾠarea ﾠof ﾠhousing ﾠ
permitted ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠbuilt ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠparcel, ﾠinstead ﾠof ﾠbeing ﾠpriced ﾠin ﾠterms ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠland ﾠarea. ﾠ ﾠ
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The ﾠcoefficients ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠcontrols ﾠare ﾠbroadly ﾠconsistent ﾠwith ﾠour ﾠexpectations. ﾠ  ﾠ
Land ﾠparcels ﾠnearer ﾠcity ﾠcentres ﾠand ﾠwith ﾠlower ﾠbuilding ﾠdensities ﾠfetch ﾠhigher ﾠprices ﾠ
per ﾠsquare ﾠmeter ﾠof ﾠpermitted ﾠfloor ﾠarea; ﾠthough ﾠparcels ﾠlevelled ﾠbefore ﾠdelivery ﾠ
fetch ﾠinsignificantly ﾠhigher ﾠprices ﾠand ﾠparcels ﾠwith ﾠpublic ﾠhousing ﾠrequirements ﾠfetch ﾠ
insignificantly ﾠ lower ﾠ prices. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ method ﾠ of ﾠ sale ﾠ controls ﾠ associate ﾠ one-ﾭ‐stage ﾠ
auctions ﾠwith ﾠhigher ﾠprices, ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐stage ﾠauctions ﾠwith ﾠintermediate ﾠprices, ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠ
bidding ﾠprocess ﾠwith ﾠlower ﾠprices. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
===Insert ﾠTable ﾠ7 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
The ﾠcoefficients ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠquarterly ﾠtime ﾠdummies ﾠfrom ﾠcolumn ﾠ2 ﾠof ﾠTable ﾠ7 ﾠare ﾠ
plotted ﾠin ﾠFigure ﾠ8; ﾠand ﾠcan ﾠbe ﾠinterpreted ﾠas ﾠa ﾠreal ﾠconstant ﾠquality ﾠresidential ﾠland ﾠ
price ﾠindex ﾠfor ﾠthese ﾠcities. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠfigure ﾠshows ﾠland ﾠprices ﾠsurging ﾠin ﾠ2009 ﾠQ2 ﾠand ﾠ
rising ﾠuntil ﾠthey ﾠpeaked ﾠ at ﾠthe ﾠ end ﾠ of ﾠ2009. ﾠ  ﾠ Overall, ﾠ the ﾠ index ﾠ almost ﾠ doubled ﾠ
(97.4%) ﾠfrom ﾠ2009 ﾠQ1 ﾠto ﾠ2009 ﾠQ4; ﾠcorresponding ﾠneatly ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠsurge ﾠin ﾠlending ﾠto ﾠ
SOEs, ﾠand ﾠespecially ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠthat ﾠFigure ﾠ4 ﾠshows ﾠbeginning ﾠin ﾠ2009 ﾠQ1. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
===Insert ﾠFigure ﾠ8 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
A ﾠ near ﾠ doubling ﾠ of ﾠ land ﾠ price ﾠ within ﾠ one ﾠ year ﾠ is ﾠ extraordinary ﾠ by ﾠ any ﾠ
reasonable ﾠ standards. ﾠ  ﾠ Fundamentals ﾠ explanations ﾠ are ﾠ always ﾠ possible ﾠ if ﾠ one ﾠ is ﾠ
flexible ﾠ enough ﾠ with ﾠ assumptions. ﾠ  ﾠ For ﾠ example, ﾠ wild ﾠ swings ﾠ in ﾠ rational ﾠ agents' ﾠ
expectations ﾠ due ﾠ to ﾠ radical ﾠ shifts ﾠ in ﾠ political ﾠ or ﾠ economic ﾠ forecasts, ﾠ demand, ﾠ ﾠ
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regulation, ﾠsavings ﾠbehavior, ﾠmight ﾠdo ﾠthe ﾠtrick. ﾠ  ﾠ However, ﾠthe ﾠabrupt ﾠprominence ﾠ
of ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠdevelopers ﾠas ﾠland ﾠprices ﾠsurged ﾠis ﾠsurely ﾠstrong ﾠcircumstantial ﾠevidence ﾠ
consistent ﾠwith ﾠour ﾠthesis. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ
5.2 ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ Estimating ﾠthe ﾠPrice ﾠEffect ﾠof ﾠSOE ﾠDevelopers ﾠ
We ﾠfurther ﾠexplore ﾠthe ﾠlinkage ﾠbetween ﾠSOE ﾠparticipation ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠ
sector ﾠand ﾠland ﾠparcel ﾠprices ﾠby ﾠincluding ﾠbuyer ﾠcharacteristics ﾠin ﾠour ﾠregressions. ﾠ  ﾠ
These ﾠinclude ﾠindicator ﾠvariables ﾠfor ﾠbuyers ﾠcontrolled ﾠby ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠand ﾠL-ﾭ‐SOEs, ﾠCSOE ﾠ
and ﾠLSOE, ﾠrespectively; ﾠan ﾠindicator ﾠvariable ﾠset ﾠto ﾠone ﾠif ﾠthe ﾠbuyer ﾠis ﾠa ﾠlisted ﾠfirm, ﾠ
LISTED; ﾠand ﾠa ﾠset ﾠof ﾠindicator ﾠvariables ﾠcorresponding ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠgrade ﾠthe ﾠgovernment ﾠ
assigns ﾠ the ﾠ developer, ﾠ GRADE1 ﾠ through ﾠ GRADE5 ﾠ in ﾠ descending ﾠ order ﾠ of ﾠ quality. ﾠ  ﾠ
Table ﾠ 8 ﾠ reports ﾠ the ﾠ results. ﾠ  ﾠ Again, ﾠ like ﾠ in ﾠ Table ﾠ 7, ﾠ all ﾠ the ﾠ three ﾠ estimators ﾠ are ﾠ
applied ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠresults ﾠare ﾠconsistent. ﾠ ﾠThe ﾠindicator ﾠvariables ﾠfor ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠand ﾠL-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠ
buyers, ﾠespecially ﾠthe ﾠformer, ﾠattract ﾠsignificantly ﾠpositive ﾠcoefficients, ﾠimplying ﾠthat ﾠ
they ﾠoffer ﾠinexplicably ﾠ(in ﾠterms ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠcontrol ﾠvariables) ﾠhigh ﾠprices ﾠfor ﾠland ﾠparcels. ﾠ  ﾠ
The ﾠrobust ﾠclustered ﾠsandwich ﾠestimator ﾠregressions ﾠ(column2) ﾠshow ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠand ﾠ
L-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠpaying ﾠ16% ﾠand ﾠ11% ﾠmore, ﾠrespectively, ﾠthan ﾠnon-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠbuyers ﾠfor ﾠland ﾠparcels ﾠ
that ﾠare ﾠotherwise ﾠidentical ﾠin ﾠterms ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠcharacteristics ﾠwe ﾠobserve. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
===Insert ﾠTable ﾠ8 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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These ﾠ price ﾠ premiums ﾠ at ﾠ least ﾠ partially ﾠ explain ﾠ the ﾠ surge ﾠ we ﾠ observe ﾠ in ﾠ
residential ﾠland ﾠprices. ﾠ  ﾠ Figure ﾠ9 ﾠprovides ﾠthe ﾠconstant ﾠquality ﾠprices ﾠof ﾠdifferent ﾠ
buyer ﾠgroups. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠfigure ﾠshows ﾠthe ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠgroup's ﾠconstant ﾠprice ﾠindex ﾠsurges ﾠin ﾠ
2009 ﾠ Q1, ﾠ followed ﾠ by ﾠ the ﾠ other ﾠ groups͛ ƉƌŝĐĞ ŝŶĚŝĐĞƐ͕ ĂŶĚ the ﾠ C-ﾭ‐SOEs' ﾠ index ﾠ
persistently ﾠexceeds ﾠthose ﾠof ﾠothers ﾠafter ﾠ2009 ﾠQ1. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠclearly ﾠsuggests ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠ
C-ﾭ‐SOEs' ﾠparticipation ﾠin ﾠland ﾠlease ﾠmarkets ﾠplays ﾠa ﾠrole ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠrise ﾠof ﾠland ﾠprices ﾠin ﾠ
China ﾠ from ﾠ 2009 ﾠ Q1 ﾠ through ﾠ the ﾠ end ﾠ of ﾠ our ﾠ sample.
 ﾠ  ﾠ Our ﾠ estimate ﾠ is ﾠ likely ﾠ
conservative, ﾠfor ﾠin ﾠa ﾠChina ﾠwithout ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠbids, ﾠother ﾠdevelopers ﾠbids ﾠwould ﾠsurely ﾠ
be ﾠlower ﾠthan ﾠthose ﾠwe ﾠobserve. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
===== ﾠInsert ﾠFigure ﾠ9 ﾠabout ﾠhere ﾠ===== ﾠ
5.3 ﾠ  ﾠ Robustness ﾠ
Other ﾠfactors ﾠmight ﾠcontribute ﾠto ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠdevelopers' ﾠhigh ﾠbids. ﾠ  ﾠ First, ﾠ
C-ﾭ‐SOEs' ﾠ connections ﾠ have ﾠ surely ﾠ long ﾠ provided ﾠ privileged ﾠ access ﾠ to ﾠ government ﾠ
funds, ﾠloans ﾠfrom ﾠSOE ﾠbanks, ﾠetc. ﾠ(Allen, ﾠQian, ﾠand ﾠQian, ﾠ2005); ﾠwhich ﾠwould ﾠcut ﾠ
their ﾠcosts ﾠof ﾠcapital ﾠand ﾠjustify ﾠtheir ﾠhigher ﾠbids ﾠfor ﾠland ﾠparcels. ﾠ  ﾠ Second ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs' ﾠ
connections ﾠmight ﾠlikewise ﾠprovide ﾠspeedier ﾠpermit ﾠapproval, ﾠutility ﾠaccess, ﾠand ﾠso ﾠ
on; ﾠwhich ﾠwould ﾠmake ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠdevelopments ﾠmore ﾠprofitable ﾠfor ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs, ﾠagain ﾠ
justifying ﾠtheir ﾠpaying ﾠhigher ﾠprices ﾠfor ﾠland ﾠparcels. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
However, ﾠneither ﾠalternative ﾠfully ﾠexplains ﾠour ﾠfindings. ﾠ  ﾠ C-ﾭ‐SOEs' ﾠsuperior ﾠ
connections ﾠhave ﾠlong ﾠbeen ﾠa ﾠfixture ﾠof ﾠChinese ﾠbusiness ﾠ(McGregor ﾠ2010). ﾠ  ﾠ Figure ﾠ
9 ﾠshows ﾠthat ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠonly ﾠbegan ﾠpaying ﾠprices ﾠsubstantially ﾠhigher ﾠthan ﾠthose ﾠpaid ﾠby ﾠ ﾠ
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other ﾠbuyers ﾠwhen ﾠthe ﾠstimulus ﾠprogram ﾠbegan. ﾠ  ﾠ Before ﾠthat, ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs' ﾠprices ﾠwere ﾠ
sometimes ﾠslightly ﾠabove ﾠor ﾠbelow ﾠthose ﾠpaid ﾠby ﾠother ﾠbuyers. ﾠ  ﾠ Table ﾠ9 ﾠconfirms ﾠ
that ﾠthis ﾠeffect ﾠis ﾠstatistically ﾠsignificant: ﾠthe ﾠgap ﾠbetween ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs' ﾠbids ﾠand ﾠthose ﾠby ﾠ
other ﾠbuyers ﾠbecame ﾠsignificantly ﾠelevated ﾠafter ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ2009, ﾠwhen ﾠthe ﾠ
macroeconomic ﾠ stimulus ﾠ began. ﾠ  ﾠ Moreover, ﾠ locally-ﾭ‐controlled ﾠ SOEs ﾠ should ﾠ also ﾠ
have ﾠ connections, ﾠ especially ﾠ with ﾠ the ﾠ local ﾠ authorities ﾠ regulating ﾠ real ﾠ estate ﾠ
developments. ﾠ  ﾠ Had ﾠconnections ﾠsuddenly ﾠbecome ﾠa ﾠmajor ﾠadvantage ﾠto ﾠSOE ﾠreal ﾠ
estate ﾠdevelopers ﾠin ﾠ2009, ﾠL-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠshould ﾠhave ﾠresponded ﾠtoo; ﾠbut ﾠTable ﾠ9 ﾠshows ﾠno ﾠ
such ﾠeffect. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
===== ﾠInsert ﾠTable ﾠ9 ﾠabout ﾠhere ﾠ===== ﾠ
Conceivably, ﾠthe ﾠvalue ﾠof ﾠSOEs' ﾠconnections ﾠmight ﾠhave ﾠlain ﾠdormant ﾠuntil ﾠ
2008, ﾠwhen ﾠthe ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠwere ﾠsuddenly ﾠinundated ﾠwith ﾠunprecedented ﾠquantities ﾠof ﾠ
cheap ﾠloans, ﾠand ﾠpressured ﾠto ﾠinvest ﾠit ﾠquickly. ﾠ  ﾠ Location ﾠis ﾠimportant ﾠin ﾠreal ﾠestate, ﾠ
and ﾠSOE ﾠexecutives' ﾠconnections ﾠare ﾠlikely ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠespecially ﾠuseful ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠcities ﾠthat ﾠ
host ﾠtheir ﾠheadquarters. ﾠ  ﾠ Indeed, ﾠaccess ﾠto ﾠlocal ﾠnetworks ﾠis ﾠthought ﾠimportant ﾠin ﾠ
explaining ﾠ agglomeration ﾠ in ﾠ developed ﾠ economies ﾠ (Ellison ﾠ and ﾠ Glaeser, ﾠ 1999). ﾠ  ﾠ
Table ﾠ10 ﾠinvestigates ﾠthis ﾠby ﾠincluding ﾠinteractions ﾠto ﾠsee ﾠif ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠpay ﾠmore ﾠfor ﾠland ﾠ
nearer ﾠ their ﾠ headquarters. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠ is ﾠ observed, ﾠ but ﾠ the ﾠ stimulus ﾠ effect ﾠ remains ﾠ
significant. ﾠ  ﾠ Thus, ﾠTable ﾠ10 ﾠconcedes ﾠthat ﾠconnections ﾠmay ﾠindeed ﾠhelp ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠland ﾠ
developers, ﾠ but ﾠ reaffirms ﾠ a ﾠ transmission ﾠ role ﾠ for ﾠ C-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠ in ﾠ the ﾠ macroeconomic ﾠ
stimulus. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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==== ﾠTable ﾠ10 ﾠabout ﾠhere ﾠ===== ﾠ
Another ﾠpossibility ﾠis ﾠthat ﾠwe ﾠcontrol ﾠimperfectly ﾠfor ﾠland ﾠparcel ﾠquality, ﾠand ﾠ
C-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠmight ﾠbe ﾠdisproportionately ﾠpurchasing ﾠhigher ﾠquality ﾠland ﾠafter ﾠ2008. ﾠ  ﾠ We ﾠ
therefore ﾠ consider ﾠ additional ﾠ variables ﾠ in ﾠ our ﾠ hedonic ﾠ regressions. ﾠ  ﾠ Beijing, ﾠ
Shenzhen, ﾠ Shanghai, ﾠ Tianjin, ﾠ and ﾠ Wuhan ﾠ have ﾠ subways, ﾠ so ﾠ we ﾠ introduce ﾠ the ﾠ
logarithm ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠdistance ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠnearest ﾠsubway ﾠstation ﾠas ﾠanother ﾠquality ﾠmeasure ﾠ
and ﾠ rerun ﾠ our ﾠ regressions ﾠ using ﾠ only ﾠ data ﾠ from ﾠ these ﾠ five ﾠ cities. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠ exercise ﾠ
generates ﾠqualitatively ﾠsimilar ﾠresults ﾠto ﾠthose ﾠshown ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠtables, ﾠby ﾠwhich ﾠwe ﾠ
mean ﾠ identical ﾠ patterns ﾠ of ﾠ signs ﾠ and ﾠ significance ﾠ levels ﾠ and ﾠ roughly ﾠ comparable ﾠ
coefficient ﾠmagnitudes. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
Another ﾠ approach ﾠ to ﾠ capture ﾠ the ﾠ effects ﾠ of ﾠ missing ﾠ hedonic ﾠ factors ﾠ is ﾠ to ﾠ
directly ﾠintroduce ﾠthe ﾠprice ﾠof ﾠcomparable ﾠnewly-ﾭ‐built ﾠhousing ﾠunits. ﾠ  ﾠ We ﾠtherefore ﾠ
match ﾠeach ﾠland ﾠtransactions ﾠin ﾠBeijing ﾠwith ﾠthe ﾠprice ﾠof ﾠnewly ﾠcompleted ﾠresidential ﾠ
housing ﾠno ﾠmore ﾠthan ﾠfive ﾠkilometers ﾠaway ﾠand ﾠsold ﾠno ﾠmore ﾠthan ﾠtwelve ﾠmonths ﾠ
earlier. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠlets ﾠus ﾠmatch ﾠeach ﾠof ﾠ296 ﾠland ﾠtransactions ﾠto ﾠone ﾠor ﾠmore ﾠof ﾠ907 ﾠ
completed ﾠresidential ﾠhousing ﾠdevelopments. ﾠ  ﾠ For ﾠeach ﾠtransaction, ﾠwe ﾠtake ﾠthe ﾠ
average ﾠ sale ﾠ price ﾠ during ﾠ the ﾠ previous ﾠ month ﾠ of ﾠ housing ﾠ units ﾠ in ﾠ the ﾠ matched ﾠ
completed ﾠ developments, ﾠ weighted ﾠby ﾠ the ﾠ reciprocal ﾠ of ﾠthe ﾠ distance. ﾠ  ﾠ We ﾠ then ﾠ
include ﾠthis ﾠ"neighborhood ﾠprice" ﾠas ﾠan ﾠadditional ﾠright-ﾭ‐hand ﾠside ﾠvariable. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠ




6. ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ Macroeconomic ﾠImpact ﾠof ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠLand ﾠTransactions ﾠ
For ﾠ SOEs ﾠ to ﾠ constitute ﾠ a ﾠ macroeconomic ﾠ policy ﾠ channel, ﾠ their ﾠ real ﾠ estate ﾠ
investments ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠassociated ﾠsurge ﾠin ﾠland ﾠprices ﾠmust ﾠhave ﾠa ﾠmacroeconomic ﾠ
impact. ﾠ  ﾠ Two ﾠdirect ﾠeffects ﾠcontribute ﾠto ﾠGDP. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
First, ﾠ by ﾠ increasing ﾠ the ﾠ overall ﾠ value ﾠ of ﾠ land ﾠ transactions, ﾠ C-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠ directly ﾠ
elevate ﾠaggregate ﾠinvestment ﾠand ﾠtherefore ﾠGDP. ﾠ  ﾠ To ﾠassess ﾠthe ﾠimportance ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ
real ﾠestate ﾠrelated ﾠsectors ﾠto ﾠGDP, ﾠwe ﾠcalculate ﾠwhat ﾠGDP ﾠgrowth ﾠwould ﾠhave ﾠbeen ﾠ
without ﾠthe ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠrelated ﾠsectors.
23 ﾠ  ﾠ For ﾠexample, ﾠChina's ﾠ2009 ﾠGDP ﾠgrowth ﾠ
was ﾠ9.3%, ﾠbut ﾠwould ﾠhave ﾠbeen ﾠonly ﾠ8.3% ﾠwithout ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠrelated ﾠsectors. ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠ
other ﾠwords, ﾠthe ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠrelated ﾠsectors ﾠwere ﾠresponsible ﾠfor ﾠroughly ﾠ11% ﾠof ﾠ
total ﾠGDP ﾠgrowth. ﾠ  ﾠ Figure ﾠ10 ﾠgraphs ﾠthis ﾠfraction ﾠby ﾠyear, ﾠand ﾠshows ﾠthe ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠ
related ﾠsectors' ﾠcontribution ﾠto ﾠGDP ﾠgrowth ﾠpeaking ﾠin ﾠ2009. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
===Insert ﾠFigure ﾠ10 ﾠabout ﾠhere=== ﾠ
Second, ﾠrevenue ﾠfrom ﾠland ﾠlease ﾠsales ﾠaccrues ﾠto ﾠChinese ﾠgovernment. ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠ
2009 ﾠtotal ﾠgovernment ﾠspending ﾠgrew ﾠby ﾠ23%, ﾠfrom ﾠRMB ﾠ6.26 ﾠtrillion ﾠin ﾠ2008 ﾠto ﾠ
RMB ﾠ7.63 ﾠtrillion ﾠin ﾠ2009; ﾠwhile ﾠtotal ﾠbudgetary ﾠgovernment ﾠrevenues ﾠrose ﾠonly ﾠ11.7% ﾠ
to ﾠRMB ﾠ6.85 ﾠtrillion. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠleft ﾠChinese ﾠgovernment ﾠwith ﾠan ﾠoverall ﾠdeficit ﾠof ﾠRMB ﾠ
0.78 ﾠtrillion, ﾠ6.2 ﾠtimes ﾠas ﾠmuch ﾠas ﾠthat ﾠin ﾠ2008.
24 ﾠ  ﾠ Governments' ﾠrevenues ﾠfrom ﾠland ﾠ
sales ﾠʹ ﾠRMB ﾠ1.39 ﾠtrillion ﾠin ﾠ2009, ﾠand ﾠup ﾠover ﾠ60% ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠprevious ﾠyear, ﾠwas ﾠthus ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
23 ﾠ In ﾠthe ﾠcalculations, ﾠwe ﾠdefine ﾠ"real ﾠestate ﾠrelated ﾠsectors" ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠaggregate ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠand ﾠ
construction ﾠindustries. 
24 ﾠ Source: ﾠNational ﾠBureau ﾠof ﾠStatistics, ﾠChina. ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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an ﾠimportant ﾠfactor ﾠin ﾠpreventing ﾠa ﾠmajor ﾠcontraction ﾠin ﾠgovernment ﾠspending.
25 ﾠ ﾠ
Clearly, ﾠthe ﾠhike ﾠin ﾠland ﾠauction ﾠincome ﾠplayed ﾠa ﾠcritical ﾠrole ﾠin ﾠfinancing ﾠthe ﾠfiscal ﾠ
stimulation ﾠpolicies ﾠfor ﾠChinese ﾠgovernment.
26 ﾠ
However, ﾠ sustainably ﾠ high ﾠ GDP ﾠ growth ﾠ in ﾠ the ﾠ long ﾠ run ﾠ depends ﾠ on ﾠ the ﾠ
efficiency ﾠof ﾠresource ﾠallocation. ﾠ  ﾠ Wu, ﾠGyourko ﾠand ﾠDeng ﾠ(2010) ﾠargue ﾠthat ﾠChinese ﾠ
land ﾠprices ﾠwere ﾠalready ﾠabove ﾠfundamental ﾠvalues ﾠin ﾠsome ﾠcities, ﾠnotably ﾠBeijing, ﾠ
prior ﾠ to ﾠ the ﾠ stimulus ﾠ package, ﾠ and ﾠ that ﾠ 2009 ﾠ and ﾠ early ﾠ 2010 ﾠ saw ﾠ increasingly ﾠ
effervescent ﾠ land ﾠ prices. ﾠ  ﾠ While ﾠ this ﾠ might ﾠ increase ﾠ nominal ﾠ wealth ﾠ for ﾠ
homeowners, ﾠand ﾠthus ﾠencourage ﾠthem ﾠto ﾠincrease ﾠconsumption; ﾠit ﾠburdens ﾠothers ﾠ
with ﾠlarger ﾠinterest ﾠpayments, ﾠdecreasing ﾠtheir ﾠquality ﾠof ﾠlife. ﾠ  ﾠ Moreover, ﾠas ﾠrecent ﾠ
American ﾠmacroeconomic ﾠevents ﾠmake ﾠclear, ﾠthe ﾠimplosion ﾠof ﾠa ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠprice ﾠ
bubble ﾠ decreases ﾠ homeowners' ﾠ wealth ﾠ significantly, ﾠ reduces ﾠ their ﾠ consumption, ﾠ
leaves ﾠpeople ﾠburdened ﾠwith ﾠlarge ﾠdebts, ﾠand ﾠleaves ﾠthe ﾠeconomy ﾠwith ﾠa ﾠsurfeit ﾠof ﾠ
unprofitable ﾠhousing ﾠdevelopments. ﾠ  ﾠ If ﾠChina's ﾠmacroeconomic ﾠstimulus ﾠvia ﾠits ﾠSOE ﾠ
channel ﾠ is ﾠ merely ﾠ replicating ﾠ this ﾠ effect, ﾠ a ﾠ truly ﾠ epic ﾠ tale ﾠ of ﾠ short-ﾭ‐term ﾠ gain ﾠ for ﾠ
long-ﾭ‐term ﾠpain ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠunfolding. ﾠ
 ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
25 ﾠ Source: ﾠSoufun ﾠDatabase. ﾠ  
26 ﾠ More ﾠprecisely, ﾠland ﾠauction ﾠincome ﾠis ﾠespecially ﾠimportant ﾠfor ﾠfinancing ﾠlocal ﾠgovernment ﾠsince ﾠin ﾠ
China ﾠall ﾠland ﾠrevenues ﾠaccrue ﾠto ﾠlocal ﾠgovernments. ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠ2009 ﾠthe ﾠoverall ﾠdeficit ﾠat ﾠlocal ﾠgovernment ﾠ
level ﾠreached ﾠRMB2.8 ﾠtrillion. ﾠ ﾠ
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7. ﾠ  ﾠ Conclusion ﾠ
China's ﾠ macroeconomic ﾠ stimulus ﾠ had ﾠ an ﾠ extraordinarily ﾠ large ﾠ and ﾠ rapid ﾠ effect. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
This ﾠreflects ﾠthe ﾠcentral ﾠgovernment's ﾠcontinued ﾠdirect ﾠcontrols ﾠover ﾠmuch ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ
economy. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠcentral ﾠgovernment ﾠordered ﾠits ﾠSOE ﾠbanks ﾠto ﾠlend, ﾠand ﾠthey ﾠlent; ﾠ
but ﾠ primarily ﾠ to ﾠ the ﾠ central ﾠ government's ﾠ nonfinancial ﾠ SOEs. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ central ﾠ
government ﾠordered ﾠits ﾠnonfinancial ﾠSOEs ﾠto ﾠinvest, ﾠand ﾠthey ﾠinvested; ﾠbut ﾠprimarily ﾠ
in ﾠ real ﾠ estate. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠ increased ﾠ GDP ﾠ substantially ﾠ and ﾠ rapidly ﾠ in ﾠ 2009, ﾠ effectively ﾠ
countering ﾠ the ﾠ effects ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ global ﾠ financial ﾠ crisis ﾠ that ﾠ affected ﾠ many ﾠ other ﾠ
countries ﾠthat ﾠyear. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
However, ﾠ the ﾠ success ﾠ of ﾠ this ﾠ stimulus ﾠ may ﾠ well ﾠ disguise ﾠ a ﾠ curse. ﾠ The ﾠ
economic ﾠ logic ﾠ behind ﾠ a ﾠ monetary ﾠ stimulation ﾠ is ﾠ to ﾠ keep ﾠ credit ﾠ flowing ﾠ to ﾠ
economically ﾠviable ﾠfirms ﾠby ﾠcountering ﾠbanks' ﾠtendency ﾠto ﾠtighten ﾠcredit ﾠconstraints ﾠ
during ﾠa ﾠdownturn. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠChinese ﾠstimulus, ﾠin ﾠcontrast, ﾠstrengthened ﾠthe ﾠflow ﾠof ﾠ
credit ﾠ into ﾠ already ﾠ cash-ﾭ‐flush ﾠ C-ﾭ‐SOEs, ﾠ which ﾠ were ﾠ almost ﾠ certainly ﾠ not ﾠ credit ﾠ
constrained ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠtime. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
Two ﾠ conclusions ﾠ follow. ﾠ  ﾠ First, ﾠ China ﾠ remains ﾠ fundamentally ﾠ a ﾠ command ﾠ
and ﾠcontrol ﾠeconomy, ﾠdespite ﾠits ﾠseemingly ﾠrapid ﾠembrace ﾠof ﾠmarkets. ﾠ  ﾠ Compared ﾠ
with ﾠmost ﾠdeveloped ﾠeconomies ﾠand ﾠmost ﾠother ﾠemerging ﾠeconomies, ﾠthe ﾠChinese ﾠ
economy ﾠ remains ﾠ subject ﾠ to ﾠ remarkably ﾠ sweeping ﾠ direct ﾠ control ﾠ by ﾠ the ﾠ central ﾠ
government. ﾠ  ﾠ While ﾠother ﾠgovernments ﾠmust ﾠrely ﾠon ﾠ"jawboning" ﾠand ﾠinterest ﾠrate ﾠ
signals ﾠto ﾠstimulate ﾠlending ﾠand ﾠinvestment, ﾠChina's ﾠgovernment ﾠcan ﾠsimply ﾠdecree ﾠ
that ﾠits ﾠSOEs ﾠaffect ﾠa ﾠmacroeconomic ﾠstimulus. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ"Chinese ﾠmodel" ﾠof ﾠeconomic ﾠ ﾠ
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development, ﾠ with ﾠ the ﾠ Communist ﾠ Party ﾠ retaining ﾠ the ﾠ economy's ﾠ commanding ﾠ
heights, ﾠhas ﾠgenerated ﾠthree ﾠdecades ﾠof ﾠrapid ﾠgrowth. ﾠ  ﾠ To ﾠthe ﾠextent ﾠthat ﾠsuch ﾠ
"ordered ﾠup" ﾠlending ﾠand ﾠinvestment ﾠartificially ﾠaccelerated ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠinvestment ﾠ
and ﾠelevated ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠprices, ﾠabove ﾠfundamentals, ﾠa ﾠmajor ﾠmisallocation ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ
economy's ﾠresources ﾠmay ﾠhave ﾠensued. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠmay ﾠbrake ﾠfuture ﾠgrowth. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
Second, ﾠ the ﾠ macroeconomic ﾠ effectiveness ﾠ of ﾠ expansionary ﾠ fiscal ﾠ and ﾠ
monetary ﾠpolicies ﾠdepend, ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠlong ﾠrun, ﾠon ﾠsustained ﾠmicroeconomic ﾠefficiency. ﾠ  ﾠ
The ﾠmicroeconomic ﾠimplications ﾠof ﾠChina's ﾠ"ordered ﾠup" ﾠmacroeconomic ﾠstimulus ﾠ
are ﾠunclear, ﾠbut ﾠour ﾠfirst ﾠpass ﾠover ﾠthe ﾠfigures ﾠsuggests ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠthe ﾠpossibility ﾠof ﾠan ﾠ
expanding ﾠhousing ﾠbubble ﾠin ﾠ2009 ﾠand ﾠ2010. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
A ﾠsharp ﾠdrop ﾠin ﾠhousing ﾠprices ﾠin ﾠChina ﾠis ﾠunlikely ﾠto ﾠtrigger ﾠa ﾠfinancial ﾠcrisis ﾠ
of ﾠthe ﾠsort ﾠAmerica ﾠrecently ﾠexperienced. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠis ﾠbecause ﾠthe ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠbanks ﾠthat ﾠ
abruptly ﾠupped ﾠtheir ﾠlending ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠnonfinancial ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠthat ﾠrecycled ﾠthose ﾠloans ﾠ
into ﾠ real ﾠ estate ﾠ remain ﾠ cash ﾠ flush. ﾠ  ﾠ A ﾠ collapse ﾠ in ﾠ land ﾠ prices ﾠ would ﾠ harm ﾠ their ﾠ
balance ﾠsheets, ﾠbut ﾠis ﾠunlikely ﾠto ﾠdamage ﾠthem ﾠseverely. ﾠ  ﾠ In ﾠaddition, ﾠwidespread ﾠ
mortgage ﾠdefaults ﾠby ﾠhome ﾠbuyers ﾠare ﾠunlikely ﾠbecause ﾠrequired ﾠdown-ﾭ‐payments ﾠ
ranged ﾠfrom ﾠthirty ﾠto ﾠforty ﾠpercent. ﾠ  ﾠ Homeowners ﾠmight ﾠtake ﾠcapital ﾠlosses, ﾠbut ﾠ
would ﾠ not ﾠ profit ﾠ from ﾠ abandoning ﾠ their ﾠ investments ﾠ unless ﾠ the ﾠ prices ﾠ collapsed ﾠ
utterly. ﾠ  ﾠ Finally, ﾠhome ﾠownership ﾠin ﾠChina ﾠopens ﾠaccess ﾠto ﾠsocial ﾠbenefits, ﾠsuch ﾠas ﾠ
schools, ﾠand ﾠcontributes ﾠto ﾠone's ﾠsocial ﾠstatus. ﾠ  ﾠ Such ﾠconsiderations ﾠmake ﾠmortgage ﾠ
defaults ﾠcostly, ﾠeven ﾠif ﾠthe ﾠmortgage ﾠis ﾠsomewhat ﾠ"under-ﾭ‐water" ﾠʹ ﾠthat ﾠis, ﾠeven ﾠif ﾠ
property ﾠvalues ﾠfall ﾠbelow ﾠoutstanding ﾠmortgage ﾠdebts. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
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Nonetheless, ﾠa ﾠsharp ﾠdecline ﾠin ﾠhouse ﾠprice ﾠwould ﾠmean ﾠa ﾠsharp ﾠdecline ﾠin ﾠ
the ﾠwealth ﾠof ﾠmany ﾠChinese ﾠpeople. ﾠ  ﾠ Chinese ﾠstill ﾠhave ﾠaccess ﾠto ﾠonly ﾠa ﾠvery ﾠlimited ﾠ
range ﾠ of ﾠ saving ﾠ and ﾠ investment ﾠ instruments: ﾠ essentially ﾠ only ﾠ bank ﾠ accounts, ﾠ
domestic ﾠstocks, ﾠand ﾠreal ﾠestate. ﾠ  ﾠ By ﾠstoring ﾠmuch ﾠof ﾠtheir ﾠwealth ﾠin ﾠreal ﾠestate, ﾠ
many ﾠChinese ﾠhouseholds ﾠhave ﾠbecome ﾠhouse ﾠprice ﾠdependent. ﾠ  ﾠ While ﾠan ﾠabrupt ﾠ
collapse ﾠ in ﾠ house ﾠ price ﾠ would ﾠ likely ﾠ not ﾠ irreparably ﾠ damage ﾠ C-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠ banks ﾠ or ﾠ
nonfinancial ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOEs ﾠwith ﾠreal ﾠestate ﾠoperations, ﾠit ﾠwould ﾠalmost ﾠsurely ﾠsubstantially ﾠ
decrease ﾠhousehold ﾠwealth. ﾠ  ﾠ This ﾠnegative ﾠwealth ﾠeffect ﾠcould ﾠbecome ﾠa ﾠsustained ﾠ
drag ﾠon ﾠaggregate ﾠdemand, ﾠpossibly ﾠinflicting ﾠwore ﾠlong-ﾭ‐run ﾠdamage ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠChinese ﾠ
economy ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠrecent ﾠcrisis ﾠinflicted ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠU.S. ﾠeconomy. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
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Figure ﾠ1: ﾠAnnualized ﾠReal ﾠGrowth ﾠRate ﾠof ﾠM2 ﾠand ﾠLoan ﾠBalances ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ
Source: ﾠPeople's ﾠBank ﾠof ﾠChina ﾠ(the ﾠcentral ﾠbank ﾠof ﾠChina). ﾠ
 ﾠ
 ﾠ
Figure ﾠ2: ﾠAnnualized ﾠReal ﾠGrowth ﾠRate ﾠof ﾠInvestment ﾠin ﾠFixed ﾠAssets ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ



































































































































































Figure ﾠ3: ﾠStructure ﾠof ﾠSASAC ﾠInstitutions ﾠ
China's ﾠ roughly ﾠ 300 ﾠ SASACs ﾠ include ﾠ the ﾠ SASAC ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ State ﾠ Council, ﾠ which ﾠ
supervises ﾠSOEs ﾠcontrolled ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠnational ﾠgovernment; ﾠabout ﾠ30 ﾠprovince-ﾭ‐level ﾠ
SASACs, ﾠ which ﾠ supervise ﾠ provincially-ﾭ‐controlled ﾠ SOEs; ﾠ and ﾠ numerous ﾠ municipal ﾠ
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 ﾠ
Figure ﾠ4: ﾠLoan ﾠBalance ﾠIncrements ﾠand ﾠBankers' ﾠConfidence ﾠIndex ﾠ
 ﾠ
Source: ﾠPeople's ﾠBank ﾠof ﾠChina ﾠ(the ﾠcentral ﾠbank ﾠin ﾠChina). ﾠ
Figure ﾠ5: ﾠQuarterly ﾠPerformance ﾠof ﾠSOEs ﾠ
 ﾠ










































































































































































































Figure ﾠ6: ﾠAnnualized ﾠReal ﾠGrowth ﾠRate ﾠof ﾠFixed ﾠAsset ﾠInvestment ﾠ  ﾠ
and ﾠEntrepreneurs' ﾠConfidence ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ
Source: ﾠNational ﾠBureau ﾠof ﾠStatistics, ﾠChina. ﾠ
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 ﾠ
Figure ﾠ7: ﾠMarket ﾠShare ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠThree ﾠCategories ﾠof ﾠBuyers ﾠ
Categories ﾠ are ﾠ central ﾠ government-ﾭ‐controlled ﾠ state-ﾭ‐owned ﾠ enterprise ﾠ (CSOE), ﾠ
lower-ﾭ‐level ﾠ government-ﾭ‐controlled ﾠ state-ﾭ‐owned ﾠ enterprises ﾠ (LSOE), ﾠ and ﾠ
enterprises ﾠnot ﾠdesignated ﾠas ﾠcontrolled ﾠby ﾠa ﾠgovernment ﾠ(NSOE). ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ
(A)  Market ﾠShare ﾠby ﾠTotal ﾠFloor ﾠArea ﾠ
 ﾠ
 ﾠ
(B) Market ﾠShare ﾠby ﾠTotal ﾠValue ﾠ
 ﾠ
Source: ﾠAuthors' ﾠcalculation. ﾠ

































Figure ﾠ8: ﾠConstant ﾠQuality ﾠIndex ﾠof ﾠResidential ﾠLand ﾠPrice ﾠIndex ﾠ



































































































































Figure ﾠ9: ﾠConstant ﾠQuality ﾠResidential ﾠLand ﾠPrices ﾠPaid, ﾠby ﾠBuyer ﾠType ﾠ
A ﾠmodel ﾠsimilar ﾠwith ﾠthat ﾠin ﾠTable ﾠ8 ﾠis ﾠestimated. ﾠ  ﾠ Dependant ﾠvariable ﾠis ﾠlog ﾠof ﾠ
land ﾠ price ﾠ per ﾠ square ﾠ meter ﾠ of ﾠ permitted ﾠ housing ﾠ floor ﾠ area. ﾠ  ﾠ The ﾠ C-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠ and ﾠ
L-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠ dummies ﾠ are ﾠ introduced ﾠ as ﾠ cross ﾠ terms ﾠ with ﾠ time ﾠ dummies. ﾠ  ﾠ Other ﾠ
right-ﾭ‐hand-ﾭ‐side ﾠvariables ﾠare ﾠconsistent ﾠwith ﾠthose ﾠin ﾠTable ﾠ8. ﾠ ﾠA ﾠbundle ﾠof ﾠtypical ﾠ
land ﾠparcel ﾠattributes ﾠare ﾠthen ﾠadopted ﾠto ﾠpredict ﾠthe ﾠconstant ﾠquality ﾠland ﾠprice ﾠ
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Figure ﾠ10: ﾠContribution ﾠof ﾠReal ﾠEstate ﾠRelated ﾠSectors ﾠto ﾠGDP ﾠGrowth ﾠ
 ﾠ
Source: ﾠAuthors' ﾠcalculation ﾠbased ﾠon ﾠstatistics ﾠreported ﾠby ﾠNational ﾠBureau ﾠof ﾠStatistics. ﾠ
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Table ﾠ1: ﾠThousands ﾠof ﾠEnterprises, ﾠby ﾠControl ﾠCategory ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ 2001 ﾠ 2004 ﾠ 2008 ﾠ
Domestic-ﾭ‐ ﾠFunded ﾠEnterprises ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
State ﾠOwned ﾠEnterprises ﾠ 369 ﾠ 192 ﾠ 156 ﾠ
Collective ﾠEnterprises ﾠ 858 ﾠ 456 ﾠ 260 ﾠ
Other ﾠJoint-ﾭ‐Stock ﾠEnterprises ﾠ 300 ﾠ 406 ﾠ 638 ﾠ
Private ﾠEnterprises ﾠ 1324 ﾠ 1982 ﾠ 3596 ﾠ
Other ﾠTypes ﾠ 37 ﾠ 62 ﾠ 124 ﾠ
Foreign-ﾭ‐Funded ﾠEnterprise ﾠ 139 ﾠ 152 ﾠ 186 ﾠ
Total ﾠ 3027 ﾠ 3250 ﾠ 4960 ﾠ
Note: ﾠ According ﾠ to ﾠ the ﾠ definition ﾠ of ﾠ National ﾠ Bureau ﾠ of ﾠ Statistics, ﾠ China, ﾠ "state ﾠ owned ﾠ
enterprises" ﾠrefer ﾠto ﾠenterprises ﾠwhich ﾠthe ﾠState ﾠ(i.e., ﾠcertain ﾠSASAC ﾠor ﾠSOE) ﾠis ﾠthe ﾠonly ﾠ
owner ﾠor ﾠmajority ﾠshareholder ﾠ(with ﾠmore ﾠthan ﾠ50% ﾠof ﾠshare); ﾠ"collective ﾠenterprises" ﾠrefer ﾠ
to ﾠenterprises ﾠjointed-ﾭ‐owned ﾠby ﾠa ﾠcertain ﾠgroup ﾠof ﾠpeople ﾠ(such ﾠas ﾠvillage ﾠor ﾠneighborhood); ﾠ
"other ﾠjoint-ﾭ‐stock ﾠenterprises" ﾠrefer ﾠto ﾠjoint-ﾭ‐stock ﾠenterprises ﾠwithout ﾠany ﾠsingle ﾠSASAC ﾠor ﾠ
SOE ﾠ as ﾠ the ﾠ dominant ﾠ shareholder; ﾠ "private ﾠ enterprises" ﾠ refer ﾠ to ﾠ enterprises ﾠ owned ﾠ by ﾠ
certain ﾠperson; ﾠand ﾠ"foreign-ﾭ‐funded ﾠenterprises" ﾠrefer ﾠto ﾠenterprises ﾠowned ﾠor ﾠcontrolled ﾠby ﾠ
persons ﾠor ﾠcompanies ﾠoutside ﾠmainland ﾠChina. ﾠ
Source: ﾠNational ﾠBureau ﾠof ﾠStatistics, ﾠChina. ﾠ
 ﾠ
 ﾠ
Table ﾠ2: ﾠAsset ﾠShares ﾠof ﾠVarious ﾠEnterprises ﾠin ﾠ2008 ﾠ
 ﾠ
Asset ﾠ
(trillion ﾠyuan ﾠRMB) ﾠ
Proportion ﾠin ﾠ  ﾠ
Total ﾠVolume ﾠ
Domestic-ﾭ‐ ﾠFunded ﾠEnterprises ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
State ﾠOwned ﾠEnterprises ﾠ 63.5 ﾠ 30.53% ﾠ
Collective ﾠEnterprises ﾠ 9.0 ﾠ  ﾠ 4.33% ﾠ
Other ﾠJoint-ﾭ‐Stock ﾠEnterprises ﾠ 86.9 ﾠ  ﾠ 41.78% ﾠ
Private ﾠEnterprises ﾠ 25.7 ﾠ  ﾠ 12.36% ﾠ
Other ﾠTypes ﾠ 1.4 ﾠ  ﾠ 0.67% ﾠ
Foreign-ﾭ‐Funded ﾠEnterprise ﾠ 21.5 ﾠ  ﾠ 10.34% ﾠ
Total ﾠ 208.0 ﾠ  ﾠ 100.00% ﾠ
Source: ﾠNational ﾠBureau ﾠof ﾠStatistics, ﾠChina. ﾠ ﾠ
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Table ﾠ3: ﾠBanking ﾠFinancial ﾠInstitutions ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠEnd ﾠof ﾠ2009 ﾠ
 ﾠ Number ﾠ
Asset ﾠ
(trillion ﾠRMB) ﾠ
 ﾠ Amount ﾠ Share ﾠ Amount ﾠ Share ﾠ
Policy ﾠBanks ﾠ 3 ﾠ 0.05% ﾠ 6.95 ﾠ 8.63% ﾠ
State-ﾭ‐Owned ﾠCommercial ﾠBanks ﾠ 4 ﾠ 0.07% ﾠ 39.04 ﾠ 48.47% ﾠ
Joint-ﾭ‐Stock ﾠCommercial ﾠBanks ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
State ﾠas ﾠLargest ﾠShare ﾠHolder ﾠ 11 ﾠ 0.20% ﾠ 12.59 ﾠ 15.63% ﾠ
Others ﾠ 2 ﾠ 0.04% ﾠ 2.01 ﾠ 2.50% ﾠ
Others ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
City ﾠCommercial ﾠBanks ﾠand ﾠCredit ﾠUnion ﾠ 158 ﾠ 2.80% ﾠ 5.71 ﾠ 7.09% ﾠ
Rural ﾠCommercial ﾠBanks ﾠand ﾠCredit ﾠUnion ﾠ 5241 ﾠ 93.02% ﾠ 8.64 ﾠ 10.73% ﾠ
Postal ﾠSavings ﾠBank ﾠ 1 ﾠ 0.02% ﾠ 2.70 ﾠ 3.35% ﾠ
Foreign ﾠBanks ﾠ 32 ﾠ 0.57% ﾠ 1.35 ﾠ 1.68% ﾠ
Non-ﾭ‐Bank ﾠInstitutions ﾠ 182 ﾠ 3.23% ﾠ 1.55 ﾠ 1.92% ﾠ
Total ﾠ 5634 ﾠ 100.00% ﾠ 80.53 ﾠ 100.00% ﾠ
Note: ﾠSee ﾠthe ﾠtext ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠfull ﾠlist ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠfour ﾠgroups ﾠof ﾠbanks. ﾠ
Source: ﾠPeople's ﾠBank ﾠof ﾠChina; ﾠChina ﾠBanking ﾠRegulatory ﾠCommission. ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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Table ﾠ4: ﾠGeographic ﾠDistribution ﾠof ﾠLand ﾠTransactions ﾠ
City ﾠ Deals ﾠ
Floor ﾠArea ﾠ  ﾠ
(million ﾠsq.m.) ﾠ
Total ﾠPrice ﾠ  ﾠ
(billion ﾠyuan ﾠRMB) ﾠ
Average ﾠPrice ﾠ  ﾠ
(2003 ﾠyuan ﾠper ﾠsq.m.) ﾠ
Beijing ﾠ 309 ﾠ 44.31 ﾠ 186.10 ﾠ 4200 ﾠ
Chengdu ﾠ 710 ﾠ 113.58 ﾠ 126.22 ﾠ 1111 ﾠ
Hangzhou ﾠ 704 ﾠ 60.89 ﾠ 214.86 ﾠ 3529 ﾠ
Shanghai ﾠ 401 ﾠ 48.22 ﾠ 167.99 ﾠ 3484 ﾠ
Shenzhen ﾠ 115 ﾠ 13.89 ﾠ 35.02 ﾠ 2521 ﾠ
Tianjin ﾠ 449 ﾠ 105.60 ﾠ 128.00 ﾠ 1212 ﾠ
Wuhan ﾠ 637 ﾠ 84.51 ﾠ 103.81 ﾠ 1228 ﾠ
Xian ﾠ 217 ﾠ 32.89 ﾠ 23.86 ﾠ 725 ﾠ
Total ﾠ 3542 ﾠ 503.88 ﾠ 985.87 ﾠ 1957 ﾠ
 ﾠ
 ﾠ
Table ﾠ5: ﾠDefinition ﾠand ﾠDescriptive ﾠStatistics ﾠof ﾠVariables ﾠ
Variable ﾠ Definition ﾠ Mean ﾠ Std. ﾠDev. ﾠ
LP ﾠ
Land ﾠparcel ﾠtransaction ﾠprice ﾠ(constant ﾠ2003 ﾠ
RMB ﾠ per ﾠ square ﾠ meter ﾠ of ﾠ floor ﾠ area ﾠ of ﾠ
housing ﾠpermitted ﾠto ﾠbuild ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠparcel). ﾠ
2145.21 ﾠ 2838.51 ﾠ
D_CENTER ﾠ Distance ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠcity ﾠcenter; ﾠin ﾠkilometers. ﾠ 25.61 ﾠ 23.17 ﾠ
DENSITY ﾠ Ratio ﾠof ﾠfloor ﾠarea ﾠto ﾠland ﾠarea. ﾠ 2.54 ﾠ 1.53 ﾠ
RATIO_PH ﾠ
Share ﾠof ﾠpublic ﾠhousing ﾠrequired ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠtotal ﾠ
floor ﾠarea ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠparcel. ﾠ
0.0026 ﾠ 0.051 ﾠ
LANDLEVEL ﾠ
The ﾠ parcel ﾠ is ﾠ leveled ﾠ when ﾠ delivered ﾠ to ﾠ the ﾠ
buyer ﾠor ﾠnot; ﾠ1=yes, ﾠ0=o/w. ﾠ
0.57 ﾠ 0.50 ﾠ
SIZE ﾠ
Floor ﾠarea ﾠpermitted ﾠto ﾠbuild ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠparcel; ﾠin ﾠ
million ﾠsquare ﾠmeters. ﾠ
0.14 ﾠ 0.25 ﾠ
PUBLIC ﾠ
Part ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠparcel ﾠis ﾠdesignated ﾠfor ﾠpublic ﾠuse ﾠ
or ﾠnot; ﾠ1=yes, ﾠ0=o/w. ﾠ
0.045 ﾠ 0.21 ﾠ
AUCTION ﾠ
The ﾠparcel ﾠis ﾠtransacted ﾠby ﾠone-ﾭ‐stage ﾠauction ﾠ
or ﾠnot; ﾠ1=yes, ﾠ0=o/w. ﾠ
0.24 ﾠ 0.43 ﾠ
BIDDING ﾠ
The ﾠ parcel ﾠ is ﾠ transacted ﾠ by ﾠ bidding ﾠ or ﾠ not; ﾠ
1=yes, ﾠ0=o/w. ﾠ
0.097 ﾠ 0.30 ﾠ
CSOE ﾠ
The ﾠparcel ﾠis ﾠpurchased ﾠby ﾠa ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠdeveloper ﾠ
or ﾠnot; ﾠ1=yes, ﾠ0=o/w. ﾠ
0.080 ﾠ 0.27 ﾠ
LSOE ﾠ
The ﾠparcel ﾠis ﾠpurchased ﾠby ﾠan ﾠL-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠdeveloper ﾠ
or ﾠnot; ﾠ1=yes, ﾠ0=o/w. ﾠ
0.20 ﾠ 0.40 ﾠ
LISTED ﾠ
The ﾠparcel ﾠis ﾠpurchased ﾠby ﾠa ﾠlisted ﾠcompany ﾠor ﾠ
not; ﾠ1=yes, ﾠ0=o/w. ﾠ
0.24 ﾠ 0.43 ﾠ
 ﾠ
 ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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Table ﾠ6: ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠDevelopers' ﾠShare ﾠin ﾠLand ﾠMarket ﾠ(by ﾠTotal ﾠValue) ﾠ
City ﾠ 2003-ﾭ‐2008 ﾠ 2009-ﾭ‐2010(1) ﾠ
Beijing ﾠ 24.33% ﾠ 53.53% ﾠ
Chengdu ﾠ 16.01% ﾠ 26.31% ﾠ
Hangzhou ﾠ 8.24% ﾠ 6.68% ﾠ
Shanghai ﾠ 19.85% ﾠ 29.97% ﾠ
Shenzhen ﾠ 31.55% ﾠ 6.76% ﾠ
Tianjin ﾠ 9.63% ﾠ 17.19% ﾠ
Wuhan ﾠ 19.24% ﾠ 23.37% ﾠ
Xian ﾠ 8.91% ﾠ 12.98% ﾠ
 ﾠ
 ﾠ
 ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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Table ﾠ7: ﾠBasic ﾠHedonic ﾠModel ﾠof ﾠLand ﾠParcels' ﾠPrice ﾠ
Sample ﾠis ﾠall ﾠland ﾠtransactions ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ2003 ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ
2010 ﾠ in ﾠ eight ﾠ major ﾠ cities, ﾠ as ﾠdescribed ﾠin ﾠTable ﾠ 4. ﾠ  ﾠ Dependant ﾠ variable ﾠ is ﾠ the ﾠ
natural ﾠ log ﾠ of ﾠ land ﾠ price ﾠ per ﾠ square ﾠ meter ﾠ of ﾠ permitted ﾠ housing ﾠ floor ﾠ area. ﾠ
Right-ﾭ‐hand-ﾭ‐side ﾠ variables ﾠ as ﾠ defined ﾠ in ﾠ Table ﾠ 5. ﾠ  ﾠ Numbers ﾠ in ﾠ parentheses ﾠ are ﾠ
t-ﾭ‐ratios ﾠ(column ﾠ1), ﾠor ﾠrobust ﾠt-ﾭ‐ratios ﾠadjusted ﾠfor ﾠcity-ﾭ‐level ﾠclustering ﾠ(column ﾠ2), ﾠ
or ﾠt-ﾭ‐ratios ﾠallowing ﾠfor ﾠrandom ﾠeffects ﾠ(column ﾠ3). ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ
 ﾠ (1) ﾠ (2) ﾠ (3) ﾠ
 ﾠ OLS ﾠ Clustered ﾠby ﾠCity ﾠ Random ﾠEffects ﾠ
log(D_CENTER) ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.77 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐51.05)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.77 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐24.70)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.77 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐51.27)*** ﾠ
DENSITY ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.12 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐12.55)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.12 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐4.85)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.12 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐12.66)*** ﾠ
SHARE_PH ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.11 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐0.44) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.11 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐0.82) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.10 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐0.43) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
LANDLEVEL ﾠ 0.072 ﾠ (1.18) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ 0.072 ﾠ (0.63) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ 0.074 ﾠ (1.24) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
SIZE ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.11 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐2.24)** ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.11 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐2.15)** ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.11 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐2.27)** ﾠ  ﾠ
PUBLIC ﾠ 0.17 ﾠ (2.51)** ﾠ  ﾠ 0.17 ﾠ (2.80)*** ﾠ 0.17 ﾠ (2.58)** ﾠ  ﾠ
AUCTION ﾠ 0.29 ﾠ (6.39)*** ﾠ 0.29 ﾠ (4.50)*** ﾠ 0.29 ﾠ (6.38)*** ﾠ
BIDDING ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.088 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐1.69)* ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.088 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐0.88) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.087 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐1.68)* ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
City ﾠDummies ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ NO ﾠ
Time ﾠDummies ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ
Adjusted ﾠR2 ﾠ 0.99 ﾠ 0.99 ﾠ -ﾭ‐ ﾠ
Notes: ﾠ(1) ﾠCoefficients ﾠof ﾠcity ﾠand ﾠtime ﾠfixed ﾠeffects ﾠare ﾠnot ﾠshow. ﾠ  ﾠ . ﾠ
(2) ﾠNumber ﾠof ﾠobservations ﾠis ﾠ3478. ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
(3) ﾠ***: ﾠsignificant ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠ1% ﾠlevel; ﾠ**: ﾠsignificant ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠ5% ﾠlevel;*: ﾠsignificant ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠ10% ﾠlevel. ﾠ ﾠ
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Table ﾠ8: ﾠEffect ﾠof ﾠBuyers' ﾠType ﾠon ﾠLand ﾠParcels' ﾠPrice ﾠ  ﾠ
Sample ﾠis ﾠall ﾠland ﾠtransactions ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ2003 ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ
2010 ﾠ in ﾠ eight ﾠ major ﾠ cities, ﾠ as ﾠdescribed ﾠin ﾠTable ﾠ 4. ﾠ  ﾠ Dependant ﾠ variable ﾠ is ﾠ the ﾠ
natural ﾠ log ﾠ of ﾠ land ﾠ price ﾠ per ﾠ square ﾠ meter ﾠ of ﾠ permitted ﾠ housing ﾠ floor ﾠ area. ﾠ  ﾠ
Right-ﾭ‐hand-ﾭ‐side ﾠ variables ﾠ as ﾠ defined ﾠ in ﾠ Table ﾠ 5. ﾠ  ﾠ Numbers ﾠ in ﾠ parentheses ﾠ are ﾠ
t-ﾭ‐ratios ﾠ(column ﾠ1), ﾠor ﾠrobust ﾠt-ﾭ‐ratios ﾠadjusted ﾠfor ﾠcity-ﾭ‐level ﾠclustering ﾠ(column ﾠ2), ﾠ
or ﾠt-ﾭ‐ratios ﾠallowing ﾠfor ﾠrandom ﾠeffects ﾠ(column ﾠ3). ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ
 ﾠ (1) ﾠ (2) ﾠ (3) ﾠ
 ﾠ OLS ﾠ Clustered ﾠby ﾠCity ﾠ Random ﾠEffects ﾠ
CSOE ﾠ 0.16 ﾠ (3.16)*** ﾠ 0.16 ﾠ (2.79)*** ﾠ 0.16 ﾠ (3.18)*** ﾠ
LSOE ﾠ 0.11 ﾠ (3.56)*** ﾠ 0.11 ﾠ (2.96)*** ﾠ 0.11 ﾠ (3.59)*** ﾠ
log(D_CENTER) ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.71 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐46.82)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.71 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐22.53)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.71 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐47.05)*** ﾠ
DENSITY ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.10 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐10.95)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.10 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐4.33)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.10 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐11.06)*** ﾠ
SHARE_PH ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.22 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐0.97) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.22 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐2.00)** ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.22 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐0.96) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
LANDLEVEL ﾠ 0.070 ﾠ (1.19) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ 0.070 ﾠ (0.68) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ 0.073 ﾠ (1.25) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
SIZE ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.21 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐4.18)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.21 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.52)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.21 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐4.23)*** ﾠ
PUBLIC ﾠ 0.11 ﾠ (1.74)* ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ 0.11 ﾠ (1.82)* ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ 0.12 ﾠ (1.81)* ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
AUCTION ﾠ 0.28 ﾠ (6.29)*** ﾠ 0.28 ﾠ (4.68)*** ﾠ 0.27 ﾠ (6.29)*** ﾠ
BIDDING ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.17 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.31)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.17 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐1.81)* ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.17 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.32)*** ﾠ
LISTED ﾠ 0.14 ﾠ (4.33)*** ﾠ 0.14 ﾠ (2.82)*** ﾠ 0.14 ﾠ (4.37)*** ﾠ
City ﾠDummies ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ NO ﾠ
Time ﾠDummies ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ
Developer ﾠGrade ﾠ
Dummies ﾠ
YES ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ
Adjusted ﾠR2 ﾠ 0.99 ﾠ 0.99 ﾠ -ﾭ‐ ﾠ
Notes: ﾠ(1) ﾠCoefficients ﾠof ﾠcity ﾠand ﾠtime ﾠfixed ﾠeffects ﾠare ﾠnot ﾠshow. ﾠ  ﾠ . ﾠ
(2) ﾠNumber ﾠof ﾠobservations ﾠis ﾠ3478. ﾠ  ﾠ




 ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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Table ﾠ9. ﾠ  ﾠ Timing ﾠof ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠDeveloper ﾠPrice ﾠEffect ﾠ
Sample ﾠis ﾠall ﾠland ﾠtransactions ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ2003 ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ
2010 ﾠ in ﾠ eight ﾠ major ﾠ cities, ﾠ as ﾠdescribed ﾠin ﾠTable ﾠ 4. ﾠ  ﾠ Dependant ﾠ variable ﾠ is ﾠ the ﾠ
natural ﾠ log ﾠ of ﾠ land ﾠ price ﾠ per ﾠ square ﾠ meter ﾠ of ﾠ permitted ﾠ housing ﾠ floor ﾠ area. ﾠ  ﾠ
STIMULUS ﾠis ﾠan ﾠindicator ﾠvariable ﾠset ﾠto ﾠzero ﾠbefore ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ2009 ﾠand ﾠto ﾠ
one ﾠin ﾠthat ﾠquarter ﾠand ﾠthereafter. ﾠ  ﾠ Other ﾠright-ﾭ‐hand-ﾭ‐side ﾠvariables ﾠas ﾠdefined ﾠin ﾠ
Table ﾠ 5. ﾠ  ﾠ Numbers ﾠ in ﾠ parentheses ﾠ are ﾠ robust ﾠ t-ﾭ‐ratios ﾠ adjusted ﾠ for ﾠ city-ﾭ‐level ﾠ
clustering. ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ
 ﾠ  ﾠ (1) ﾠ (2) ﾠ (2) ﾠ
CSOE ﾠ 0.0908 ﾠ (1.34) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ 0.0506 ﾠ (0.83) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ 0.157 ﾠ (2.79)*** ﾠ
CSOE ﾠinteracted ﾠwith: ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
STIMULUS ﾠ 0.196 ﾠ (2.46)** ﾠ  ﾠ 0.190 ﾠ (2.50)** ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
LSOE ﾠ 0.117 ﾠ (2.19)** ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ 0.122 ﾠ (2.33)** ﾠ  ﾠ
LSOE ﾠinteracted ﾠwith: ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
STIMULUS ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00880 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐0.14) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.0290 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐0.49) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
log(D_CENTER) ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.707 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐22.6)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.709 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐22.7)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.708 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐22.5)*** ﾠ
DENSITY ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.104 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐4.35)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.105 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐4.37)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.104 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐4.33)*** ﾠ
SHARE_PH ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.269 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐2.40)** ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.266 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐2.51)** ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.226 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐1.99)* ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
LANDLEVEL ﾠ 0.0698 ﾠ (0.68) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ 0.0703 ﾠ (0.68) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ 0.0692 ﾠ (0.68) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
SIZE ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.211 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.57)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.197 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.24)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.209 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.50)*** ﾠ
PUBLIC ﾠ 0.120 ﾠ (1.92)* ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ 0.128 ﾠ (2.06)** ﾠ  ﾠ 0.116 ﾠ (1.85)* ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
AUCTION ﾠ 0.274 ﾠ (4.69)*** ﾠ 0.273 ﾠ (4.63)*** ﾠ 0.275 ﾠ (4.69)*** ﾠ
BIDDING ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.167 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐1.78)* ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.159 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐1.70)* ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.170 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐1.81)* ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
LISTED ﾠ 0.141 ﾠ (2.80)*** ﾠ 0.154 ﾠ (3.13)*** ﾠ 0.142 ﾠ (2.83)*** ﾠ
City ﾠDummies ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ
Time ﾠDummies ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ
Developer ﾠGrade ﾠ
Dummies ﾠ
YES ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ
Adjusted ﾠR2 ﾠ 0.99 ﾠ 0.99 ﾠ 0.99 ﾠ
Notes: ﾠ(1) ﾠCoefficients ﾠof ﾠcity ﾠand ﾠtime ﾠfixed ﾠeffects ﾠare ﾠnot ﾠshow. ﾠ  ﾠ . ﾠ
(2) ﾠNumber ﾠof ﾠobservations ﾠis ﾠ3478. ﾠ  ﾠ
(3) ﾠ***: ﾠsignificant ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠ1% ﾠlevel; ﾠ**: ﾠsignificant ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠ5% ﾠlevel;*: ﾠsignificant ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠ10% ﾠlevel. ﾠ
 ﾠ  ﾠ ﾠ
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Table ﾠ10. ﾠ ﾠImportance ﾠof ﾠConnections ﾠProxies ﾠto ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE ﾠPrice ﾠPremium ﾠ
Sample ﾠis ﾠall ﾠland ﾠtransactions ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ2003 ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ
2010 ﾠ in ﾠ eight ﾠ major ﾠ cities, ﾠ as ﾠdescribed ﾠin ﾠTable ﾠ 4. ﾠ  ﾠ Dependant ﾠ variable ﾠ is ﾠ the ﾠ
natural ﾠ log ﾠ of ﾠ land ﾠ price ﾠ per ﾠ square ﾠ meter ﾠ of ﾠ permitted ﾠ housing ﾠ floor ﾠ area. ﾠ  ﾠ
STIMULUS ﾠis ﾠan ﾠindicator ﾠvariable ﾠset ﾠto ﾠzero ﾠbefore ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠquarter ﾠof ﾠ2009 ﾠand ﾠto ﾠ
one ﾠ in ﾠ that ﾠ quarter ﾠ and ﾠ thereafter. ﾠ  ﾠ As ﾠ proxies ﾠ for ﾠ the ﾠ likely ﾠ strength ﾠ of ﾠ
͞ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ͟ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞC-ﾭ‐SOE's ﾠtop ﾠexecutives ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠauthorities ﾠregulating ﾠ
real ﾠestate ﾠdevelopment, ﾠwe ﾠinclude ﾠLOCAL, ﾠan ﾠindicator ﾠvariable ﾠset ﾠto ﾠone ﾠif ﾠthe ﾠ
land ﾠpurchased ﾠis ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠcity ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠC-ﾭ‐SOE's ﾠhead ﾠoffice ﾠand ﾠto ﾠzero ﾠotherwise, ﾠ
and ﾠ log(DISTANCE), ﾠ the ﾠ logarithm ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ distance ﾠ in ﾠ kilometers ﾠ between ﾠ the ﾠ
C-ﾭ‐SOE's ﾠhead ﾠoffice ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠcity ﾠin ﾠwhich ﾠthe ﾠland ﾠpurchased ﾠis ﾠlocated. ﾠ  ﾠ Other ﾠ
right-ﾭ‐hand-ﾭ‐side ﾠ variables ﾠ as ﾠ defined ﾠ in ﾠ Table ﾠ 5. ﾠ  ﾠ Numbers ﾠ in ﾠ parentheses ﾠ are ﾠ
robust ﾠt-ﾭ‐ratios ﾠadjusted ﾠfor ﾠcity-ﾭ‐level ﾠclustering. ﾠ  ﾠ
 ﾠ
 ﾠ (1) ﾠ (2) ﾠ (3) ﾠ (4) ﾠ
CSOE ﾠ 0.0358 ﾠ (0.52) ﾠ 0.381 ﾠ (4.12)*** ﾠ 0.0349 ﾠ (0.52) ﾠ 0.380 ﾠ (4.13)*** ﾠ
CSOE ﾠinteracted ﾠwith: ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
LOCAL ﾠ 0.314 ﾠ (3.38)*** ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ 0.314 ﾠ (3.36)*** ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
log(DISTANCE) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.0491 ﾠ(-ﾭ‐3.90)*** ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.0490 ﾠ(-ﾭ‐3.87)*** ﾠ
STIMULUS ﾠ 0.182 ﾠ (2.38)** ﾠ 0.162 ﾠ (2.13)** ﾠ 0.185 ﾠ (2.55)** ﾠ 0.165 ﾠ (2.26)** ﾠ
LSOE ﾠ 0.121 ﾠ (2.31)** ﾠ 0.122 ﾠ (2.32)** ﾠ 0.117 ﾠ (3.15)*** ﾠ 0.117 ﾠ (3.16)*** ﾠ
LSOE ﾠinteracted ﾠwith: ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
STIMULUS ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.0126 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐0.21) ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.0130 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐0.22) ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ  ﾠ
log(D_CENTER) ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.706 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐22.6)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.706 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐22.6)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.707 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐22.6)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.706 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐22.7)*** ﾠ
DENSITY ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.105 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐4.38)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.105 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐4.40)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.105 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐4.37)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.105 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐4.40)*** ﾠ
SHARE_PH ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.341 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.22)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.344 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.25)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.340 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.23)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.343 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.26)*** ﾠ
LANDLEVEL ﾠ 0.0678 ﾠ (0.66) ﾠ 0.0672 ﾠ (0.66) ﾠ 0.0681 ﾠ (0.67) ﾠ 0.0675 ﾠ (0.66) ﾠ
SIZE ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.208 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.56)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.207 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.52)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.209 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.59)*** ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.207 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐3.55)*** ﾠ
PUBLIC ﾠ 0.115 ﾠ (1.94)* ﾠ 0.115 ﾠ (1.93)* ﾠ 0.114 ﾠ (1.93)* ﾠ 0.115 ﾠ (1.92)* ﾠ
AUCTION ﾠ 0.272 ﾠ (4.66)*** ﾠ 0.272 ﾠ (4.65)*** ﾠ 0.272 ﾠ (4.67)*** ﾠ 0.272 ﾠ (4.66)*** ﾠ
BIDDING ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.171 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐1.85)* ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.171 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐1.85)* ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.170 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐1.87)* ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.170 ﾠ (-ﾭ‐1.86)* ﾠ
LISTED ﾠ 0.146 ﾠ (2.90)*** ﾠ 0.146 ﾠ (2.91)*** ﾠ 0.146 ﾠ (2.90)*** ﾠ 0.146 ﾠ (2.91)*** ﾠ
City ﾠDummies ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ
Time ﾠDummies ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ
Developer ﾠGrade ﾠ
Dummies ﾠ
YES ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ YES ﾠ
Adjusted ﾠR2 ﾠ 0.99 ﾠ 0.99 ﾠ 0.99 ﾠ 0.99 ﾠ
Notes: ﾠ(1) ﾠCoefficients ﾠof ﾠcity ﾠand ﾠtime ﾠfixed ﾠeffects ﾠare ﾠnot ﾠshow. ﾠ  ﾠ . ﾠ
(2) ﾠNumber ﾠof ﾠobservations ﾠis ﾠ3478. ﾠ  ﾠ
(3) ﾠ***: ﾠsignificant ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠ1% ﾠlevel; ﾠ**: ﾠsignificant ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠ5% ﾠlevel;*: ﾠsignificant ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠ10% ﾠlevel. ﾠ
 ﾠ